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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-A CTION FOR CHILDREN'S TELEVI­
SION V. FCC: INDECENCY FINES AND THE BROADCAST MEDIUM­
WHEN SUBSEQUENT PUNISHMENTS BECOME PRIOR RESTRAINTS; A 
SUBSEQUENT RESTRAINT REVIEW 
INTRODUCTION 
Consider the following scenario: Broadcasting, Inc. 1 is the 
owner and operator of WFUN, a radio station located in Hartford, 
Connecticut. It is popular among young adults throughout New 
England because of its hard, rock and roll edge and its ability to 
tackle important social issues with flair on its morning talk shows. 
Wanting to help educate its young listeners about the dangers of 
unprotected sex, Broadcasting, Inc. dedicates a morning talk show 
to the discussion of issues relating to sexually transmitted diseases 
and methods of contraception. Because the Federal Communica­
tions Commission ("FCC" or the "Commission") has no set guide­
lines delineating the material it considers "indecent," 2 
Broadcasting, Inc. is uncertain of the status of the material being 
broadcast. Nevertheless, it decides to air the program each week­
day morning because of the social importance of the subject matter. 
A little more than one year later, Broadcasting, Inc. receives a 
certified letter from the FCC stating that the talk show is under 
investigation because of its "indecent"3 content. The letter invites 
Broadcasting, Inc. to respond to these allegations of indecency. 
The company responds, and in doing so sets in motion a lengthy 
1. "Broadcasting, Inc." is a fictional entity created solely for the purpose of relat­
ing an example of the Federal Communications Commission's power and autonomy. 
2. The FCC recommends that broadcasters look to past forfeiture fines and ac­
tions against other stations in order to determine which material the FCC regards as 
indecent. 'See infra note 207 and accompanying text for a discussion of this FCC recom­
mendation, infra note 4 for the definition and discussion of the term "forfeiture," and 
infra note 25 and accompanying text for the definition of "indecency." However, the 
material the FCC determined to be "indecent" in these past forfeiture actions has never 
been judicially determined "indecent." Therefore, the FCC is asking the broadcasters 
to refrain from broadcasting speech which the courts may view as protected. See infra 
Part I.A-C for a discussion of the FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme and how a 
disgruntled broadcaster may obtain judicial review of disputed material. 
3. See infra note 25 and accompanying text for the FCC's definition of 
"indecency. " 
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and intricate forfeiture enforcement process.4 By challenging the 
indecency determination of the FCC and its forfeiture process, it 
will inevitably take Broadcasting, Inc. in excess of five years to ob­
tain a judicial determination of the status of the challenged 
material.5 
While WFUN's case is pending at the Commission's offices, 
Broadcasting, Inc. is still unsure of the legal status of the challenged 
material. It maintains that the material is not at all indecent and, 
therefore, the FCC cannot impose penalties for the broadcast of the 
speech consistent with the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution.6 Because of its belief that the material will eventually 
be adjudicated by the courts as non-indecent, and thus protected 
speech, Broadcasting, Inc. feels secure in allowing the material to 
be regularly broadcast, hoping that the availability of this material 
will assist its young listeners. 
Unfortunately, and unbeknownst to Broadcasting, Inc., each 
time similar material is broadcast the FCC imposes another fine 
upon the radio station. By the time WFUN is afforded its opportu­
nity for judicial review, it will have incurred in excess of one million 
dollars in forfeiture fines. Further, the FCC will have prevented 
Broadcasting, Inc. from transacting several proposed corporate ac­
quisitions. Finally, Broadcasting, Inc. will have been rendered in­
solvent and on the brink of bankruptcy due to its inability to raise 
capital as a result of the FCC's actions against iU 
Broadcasters argue that the FCC's forfeiture enforcement 
scheme lacks adequate provisions for judicial review and thus in­
fringes upon First Amendment rights of freedom of speech.s When 
4. The term "forfeiture" is simply the FCC's word for "fine." The forfeiture en­
forcement scheme is the process whereby the FCC determines which broadcasts it be­
lieves are "indecent" and warrant the imposition of such forfeitures and other 
enforcement penalties. When this determination is contested by the broadcasters, the 
scheme set~ forth the procedures which the broadcaster and Commission must follow in 
order to eventually obtain a judicial determination of the material's "indecency." See 
infra Part I for a detailed description of this scheme. 
5. See infra Part I.A-B for a detailed description of the enforcement scheme and 
the length of time a broadcaster is forced to wait until a judiCial review of the "indecent 
material" is available. 
6. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the free­
dom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to 
. petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
7. See infra Part I.e for a discussion of the potential consequences of the delays 
inherent in the forfeiture enforcement scheme. 
8. See infra note 139 for a list of broadcasters and organizations arguing the un­
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judicial review is unreasonably delayed, broadcasters are forced to 
"self-censor." This self-censoring effectively "chills"9 speech which 
might ultimately be determined, upon review by the courts, to be 
protected by the First Amendment. 
This issue arose in a case recently decided by the United States 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. In Action 
for Children's Television v. FCC,lO the D.C. Circuit held that in 
spite of a lengthy delay for the provision of judicial review of the 
"indecent" material, the FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme did 
not violate the broadcaster's First Amendment rights. l1 The court 
relied on Supreme Court precedent to support its holding that the 
broadcast medium of expression was afforded less First Amend­
ment protection than the printed word.12 
This Note will discuss generally the FCC, its authorized pow­
ers, and its forfeiture enforcement scheme. It will demonstrate the 
breadth of the FCC's power over the broadcast medium and the 
"chilling" effect its enforcement scheme has over nonindecent, and 
thus protected, speech. Part I will provide a description of the 
mechanisms within the FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme and 
their effects upon broadcasters. Further, this Part will briefly dis­
cuss FCC v. Pacifica Foundation,B the only Supreme Court case, to 
date, to consider the FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme. Part II 
constitutionality of the FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme in Action for Children's 
Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
9. For a definition of the "chilling of protected speech," and detailed discussion 
thereof, see Jonathan R. Siegel, Note, Chilling Injuries as a Basis for Standing, 98 YALE 
L.J. 905, 906 (1989) ("The First Amendment protects against 'abridg[ment], of the free­
dom of speech, and a government action that prohibits someone from speaking ... is 
plainly an abridgment. Government action may, however, deter someone from engag­
ing in First Amendment activity without actually prohibiting it. This deterrence is a 
'chilling effect."'). See also Michael N. Dolich, Alleging a First Amendment "Chilling 
Effect" to Create a Plaintiffs Standing: A Practical Approach, 43 DRAKE L. REv. 175, 
175-76 (1994) (defining the "chilling effect" as when an individual refrains from either 
attending a public meeting or speaking outright for fear of repercussions, however sub­
tle); Jill M. Ryan, Freedom to Speak Unintelligibly: The First Amendment Implications 
of Government-Controlled Encryption, 4 WM. & MARy BILL RTS. J. 1165, 1215 (1996) 
(stating that the "chilling effect" occurs when people are deterred from participating in 
a particular activity, and deterred from expressing themselves as they otherwise might); 
Fred C. Zacharias, Flowchaning the First Amendment, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 936, 947 
(1987) (stating that the "chilling effect" is the degree to which speech is deterred). 
10. 59 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 

1l. Id. at 1262. 

12. See id. (noting and affirming the district court's reliance on FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978». See infra Part LD and accompanying text for a com­
plete discussion of Pacifica. 
13. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
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will discuss the Supreme Court's creation of.an approach to First 
Amendment issues that focuses on the adequacy of procedural de­
vices, such as prior restraints on speech, used to regulate speech. I 
have termed this approach First Amendment Procedural Review. 
Further, this Part will briefly discuss the two foundation cases upon 
which this approach is premised: Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan I4 
and Freedman v. Maryland. Is 
Part III will describe the factual and procedural history of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir­
cuit's decision in Action for Children's Television,16 and then evalu­
ate that decision with respect to First Amendment Procedural 
ReviewP Part IV will discuss the determination by the majority in 
Action for Children's Television that the FCC forfeiture scheme was 
not technically a prior restraint on speech, but was instead a consti­
tutionally permissible subsequent punishment. This Part will then 
argue that when the dangers that exist in a typical prior restraint 
case are found to exist in a case where a prior restraint does not 
"technically" exist, a new analysis similar to the one the courts use 
in First Amendment Procedural Review should be applied-a Sub­
sequent Restraint Review. Subsequent Restraint Review ensures 
that there are rigorous procedural safeguards in place to prevent 
the infringement of First Amendment protections; namely, prompt 
judicial review. 
I. 	 FCC FORFEITURE ENFORCEMENT SCHEME: CURBING 
BROADCAST INDECENCY 
The FCC's power is quite broad, and derived explicitly from 
Congress under the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (the 
"Act").18 Under the authority granted by the Act, the FCC has 
14. 372 u.s. 58 (1963). 
15. 380 U.s. 51 (1965). 
16. 59 F.3d at 1250. 
17. See infra notes 133-36 and accompanying text for a discussion of this standard 
of review. 
18. See 47 U.S.c. §§ 151-613 (1994); DONALD J. JUNG, FEDERAL COMMUNICA­
TIONS COMMISSION, THE BROADCAST INDUSTRY, AND THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE: 1981­
19877-8 (1996) (discussing the history and development of the FCC through the pro­
mulgation of the Federal Communications Act); JEREMY H. LIPSCHULTZ, BROADCAST 
INDECENCY: F.C.C. REGULATION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 25 (1997) (discussing 
the FCC's power to regulate obscene and indecent broadcasts under the authority of 
the Act); 1 A. WALTER SOCOLOW, THE LAW OF RADIO BROADCASTING 54-56 (1939) 
(discussing the purposes of the Act and the powers it vests within the FCC). 
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developed a forfeiture enforcement scheme which can be described 
as both cumbersome and confusing. 
A. 	 Brief Overview of FCC Authority to Proscribe Broadcast 
Indecency 
Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act pursuant 
to its authority under the Commerce Clause of the United States 
Constitution.19 This Act gave the FCC exclusive jurisdiction to reg­
ulate all radio transmissions.20 Pursuant to the Act, the FCC is 
charged with enforcing violations of 18 U.S.c. § 1464, which pro­
hibits the broadcasting of obscene, indecent and profane material.21 
Further, the FCC has the authority not only to determine the guide­
lines and definition of what is "obscene or indecent"22 language, 
19. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, c1. 3 ("Congress shall have the Power To ... 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the 
Indian Tribes."). The general purpose for the Act was to "make available ... to all the 
people of the United States, a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and 
communication service with adequate facilities at reasonable charges." ROBERT SEARS 
McMAHON, FEDERAL REGULATION OF TIm RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCAST IN­
DUSTRY IN TIm UNITED STATES 1927-195893 (1979) (citation omitted). The Commis­
sion now exercises its regulatory authority over all mediums of broadcasting, including 
television. See Uf.; see also JUNG, supra note 18, at 7-8; LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 18, at 
25; SOCOLOW, supra note 18, at 54-56. 
20. Under the Act, Congress provided that the FCC be operated as an independ­
ent regulatory commission under the discretion of seven commissioners, each appointed 
by the President of the United States and approved by the Senate. See DON R. 
PEMBER, MAss MEDIA LAW 427 (2d ed. 1982). In 1982 Congress voted to modify the 
Act by reducing the number of commissioners from seven to five members. See 47 
U.S.c. §§ 154-155 (1994). The President designates one of these commissioners as 
Chairman of the FCC. See 47 U.S.c. § 154. The Commission, through these commis­
sioners acting in concert, has the power to make rules and regulations within the broad 
framework of the Commerce Clause. These regulations carry the force of law. See 
WALTER B. EMERY, BROADCASTING AND GOVERNMENT: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REG­
ULATIONS 55 (1971). 
21. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 ("For the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign 
commerce in communication by wire and radio ... there is created a commission to be 
known as the 'Federal Communications Commission,' which shall be constituted as 
hereafter provided, and which shall execute and enforce the provisions of this chap­
ter."). See also 18 U.S.c. § 1464 (1994) ("Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or 
profane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both."). 
22. Traditionally, most indecent, nonobscene speech is fully protected under the 
First Amendment and may not be restricted unless the government has a sufficiently 
important justification. The Supreme Court, however, has permitted governmental reg­
ulation of indecent expression. See Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 
(1986) (finding a zoning ordinance regulating the location of adult theaters consistent 
with the First Amendment). See generally Robert E. Riggs, Indecency on the Cable: 
Can it be Regulated?, 26 ARIz. L. REv. 269 (1984) (discussing different standards of 
review traditionally applied to indecent speech depending on its content and intended 
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but to impose forfeiture penalties upon broadcasters for any 
violations.23 
B. FCC's Forfeiture Enforcement Scheme-In Theory 
FCC review of a broadcaster's possible violation of Section 
1464 begins when a disgruntled listener complains that the broad­
caster has aired indecent materia1.24 "Indecent" is defined by the 
FCC as "language or material that depicts or describes, in terms 
patently offensive as measured by contemporary community stan­
dards for the broadcast medium, sexual or excretory activities and 
organs."25 This complaint is sent directly to the Mass Media Bu­
aim). See also Richard C. Thrkington, Introduction-Safe Harbors and Stern Warnings: 
FCC Regulation of Indecent Broadcasting, 3 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1 (1996). See 
also infra note 25 and accompanying text for the FCC's definition of indecency. The 
Court gives much greater deference to the FCC in regulating the content of the broad­
cast medium. See Riggs, supra, at 279. 
Obscenity, by contrast, is not now, and never has been protected by the United 
States Constitution. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957). In order to 
determine whether material is legally obscene, the Supreme Court uses the "Miller 
test" derived from Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). Under this test, the 
Court must determine: . 
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary community stan­
dards" would find that the work, taken as a whole; appeals to the prurient 
interest; 
(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual 
conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and 
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, polit­
ical, or scientific value.· . 
Id. at 24 (Citations omitted). 
In the broadcast medium, however, the traditional obscenity-indecency analysis is 
not followed in the Federal Communications Act of 1934. This Act "lumps together 
obscene, indecent, and profane language." LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 18, at 27. Because 
the FCC's definition of broadcast indecency is any "[l]anguage or material that depicts 
or describes ... sexual or excretory activities or organs," indecency can be merely sex­
ual discussions. Id. at 27-28. 
23. See 47 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1)(D) (1994) ("Any person who is determined by the 
Commission, in accordance with paragraph (3) or (4) of this subsection, to have ... 
violated any provision of section 1304, 1343, or 1464 of Title 18; shall be liable to the 
United States for a forfeiture penalty."). Of the three statutory provisions cited by 
§ ~03(b)(I)(D), only section 1464 of Title 18 is relevant to the FCC's indecency fines as 
discussed herein. This section provides: "Whoever utters any obscene, indecent, or pro­
fane language by means of radio communication shall be fined under this title or impris­
oned not more than two years, or both." 18 U.S.c. § 1464. 
24. See Action for Childrens Television v. FCC, 827 F. Supp. 4, 6 (D.D.C. 1993), 
affd, 59 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
25. TheFCC offered this definition in its complaint against Pacifica Foundation in 
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726,732 (1978). This definition was then adopted 
by the Supreme Court in Pacifica. See id. at 743. The FCC has affirmed its adherence 
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reau ("MMB"),26 where its staff members review the material to 
make a recommendation as to whether the material falls within the 
parameters of this definitionP 
If the MMB staff decides that the complaint does not warrant 
investigation, the complaint is dismissed.28 Alternatively, if a deter­
mination is made to investigate the complaint further, the MMB 
sends a Letter of Inquiry ("LOI"y~9 to the broadcaster of the dis­
puted material.3° The LOI is a simple request for additional infor­
mation about the disputed broadcast and does not represent a final 
determination of an indecency violation.31 After the broadcaster 
responds to the LOI, the MMB staff presents both its findings and 
the broadcaster's response thereto to the Chief of the MMB, who 
then determines whether a violation has in fact occurred.32 If the 
Chief determines that indeed there was a violation, the MMB for­
wards a Notice of Apparent Liability ("NAL") to the broadcaster.33 
to this definition. See Enforcement of Prohibitions Against Broad. Obscenity and Inde­
cency in 18 U.S.c. § 1464, 4 F.C.C.R. 457, 457 (Dec. 21, 1988).. 
26. The FCC, through its appointed commissioners, divided the agency into four 
bureaus: Common Carrier Bureau; Private Radio Bureau; Field Operations Bureau; 
and Mass Media Bureau. See T. BARTON CAR1ER ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
AND THE FOURTH ESTA1E 501, 697 (3d ed. 1985). The Mass Media Bureau receives and 
processes all applications for licenses, renewals and transfers, as well as listener com­
plaints of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1464. See id.at 501. , 
27. See Action for Childrens Television, 827 F. Supp. at 6; see also CAR1ER, supra 
note 26, at 501-02; Liability of Sagittarius Broad. Corp., 7 F.C.C.R. 6873 (OCt. 23, 1992). 
28. See Action for Childrens Television, 827 F. Supp. at 6. 
29. The LOI is'a form letter the agency routinely sends to broadcasters accused of 
broadcasting indecent material, which in relevant part states: . 
The broadcast of obscene, indecent or profane language is prohibited by a 
federal criminal statute. Although the Department of Justice is responsible 
for prosecution of federal law violations, the commission is authorized to im­
pose sanctions on broadcast licensees for violation of this statute, including 
revocation of the license or the imposition of a monetary forfeiture. However, 
both the commission and the Department of Justice are governed by past deci­
sions of the courts as to what constitutes obscenity, and the broadcast of mate­
rial which may be offensive to many persons would not necessarily be held by 
the courts to violate the statute. 
PEMBER, supra note 20, at 447. 
30. See 47 U.S.c. § 154(1) (1994) ("All reports of investigations made by the 
Commission shall be entered of record, and a copy thereof shall be furnished to the 
party who may have complained, and to any ... licensee that may have been com­
plained of."); see also Liability of Sagittarius Broad. Corp., 7 F.c.c.R. at 6873:' 
31. See Action for ChildrensTelevision, 827 F. Supp. at 6. See also supra note 29 
for the text of the LOI. 
32. See Liability ofSagittarius Broad. Corp., 7 F.C.C.R. at 6873; Letter to Mr. Mel 
Karmazin, President, Sagittarius Broad. Corp., 5 F.C.C.R. 7291 (Dec. 7, 1990). 
33. See Liability ofSagittarius Broad. Corp., 7 F.C.C.R. at 6873; see also 47 U.S.c. 
§ 503(b)(4) (1992) ("[No] forfeiture penalty shall be imposed under this subsection 
248 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:241 
No formal evidentiary hearing is required before the issuance of the 
NAL. 
Upon receipt of an NAL, the broadcaster has two options: pay 
the forfeiture,34 or submit an opposition to the NAL within 30 
days.35 If the broadcaster chooses to oppose the forfeiture it must 
explain why a forfeiture should either not be imposed, or be re­
duced.36 Once the FCC receives the broadcaster's opposition to the 
NAL, both the MMB's evaluation of the subject material as well as 
the broadcaster's response is forwarded to the five commissioners 
for their review.37 
In reviewing this material, the Commission members attempt 
to determine whether a forfeiture is appropriate.38 In making this 
determination, the Commission must consider "the nature, circum­
stances, extent, and gravity of the violation and, with respect to the 
violator, the degree of culpability, any history of prior offenses, 
against any person unless and until ... (A) ... the Commission issues a notice of 
apparent liability, in writing, with respect to such person."). 
34. The NAL sets forth an amount which the broadcaster must pay in order to 
have the complaint dismissed. This amount is typically $2,000-5,000 per NAL. See Lia­
bility of Sagittarius Broad. Corp., 7 F.c.c.R. at 6873. However, the amount of any 
forfeiture penalty could be as high as $25,000 for each violation. See 47 V.S.c. 
§ 503(b)(2)(A) ("The amount of any forfeiture penalty determined under this section 
shall not exceed a total of $25,000 for each day of a continuing violation, except that the 
amount assessed for any continuing violation shall not exceed a total of $250,000 for 
any single act or failure to act."). "Each day during which such violation occurs shall 
constitute a separate offense." 47 V.S.c. § 503(b)(1)(E). Because such fines can be 
imposed for each day of a subsequent airing of the disputed material, a broadcaster's 
forfeiture fines could feasibly amount to millions of dollars. See infra Part III for a 
discussion of the Action for Children~s Television decision and the forfeiture fines im­
posed upon Infinity Broadcasting, Inc. 
35. See 47 V.S.c. § 402(e) (1994); see also Letter to Mr. Mel Karmazin, President, 
Infinity Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C.R. 2688 (Dec. 18, 1992) (wherein the FCC informed In­
finity that "[i]n regard to this forfeiture proceeding, you are afforded a period of thirty 
(30) days from the date of this letter 'to show, in writing, why a forfeiture penalty 
should not be imposed or should be reduced, or to pay the forfeiture."'). 
36. See 47 V.S.c. § 503(b)(4)(C). A broadcaster who disputes the forfeiture "is 
granted an opportunity to show, in writing, within such reasonable period of time as the 
Commission prescribes ... why no such forfeiture penalty should be imposed." Id.; see 
also Action for Childrens Television, 827 F. Supp. at 7; Letter to Mr. Mel Karmazin, 
President, Infinity Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C.R. at 2688 ("Any showing as to why the forfei­
ture should not be imposed or should be reduced shall include a detailed factual state­
ment and such documentation and affidavits as may be pertinent."). 
37. See EMERY, supra note 20, at 55. 
38. See id. ("[C]ommissioners function as a unit, ... [with] the Chairman serving 
as the chief executive officer. . . . Four members of the commission constitute a quo­
rum for the transaction of business."). 
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ability to pay, and such other matters as justice may require."39 The 
Commission further considers the broadcaster's past history in 
broadcasting "indecent" material, as well as past forfeitures im­
posed, as factors in making this determination.40 If the commission­
ers vote for imposition of a forfeiture order, such order represents 
the final determination that the broadcaster has violated 18 U.S.c. 
§ 1464.41 If the broadcaster refuses to pay the forfeiture within 60 
days and seeks no other action, the FCC proceeds to send three 
progressively stronger "dunning letters"42 at 30 day intervals in or­
der to secure payment.43 If the broadcaster, after receipt of these 
three "dunning letters," still refuses to pay the forfeiture, the FCC 
refers the matter to a United States Attorney for collection in a 
United States District Court.44 This is the broadcaster's first oppor­
tunity45 for judicial review of the subject materia1.46 
39. Action for Childrens Television, 827 F. Supp. at 7 (quoting 47 U.S.c. 
§ S03(b)(2) (D) (1992)). 
40. See id. at 7; see also Notice of Apparent Liab. to Evergreen Media Corp., 8 
F.C.C.R. 1266, n.S (Feb. 2S, 1993); Letter to Mr. Mel Karmazin, President, Infinity 
Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C.R. at 2688 (Separate Statement of Commissioner James H. 
Quello) ("In supporting the imposition of a $600,000 fine against Infinity Broadcasting 
... I find the magnitude of this fine amply warranted in view of an apparent pattern of 
indecent broadcasts on this show.") (emphasis added). 
41. See Action for Childrens Television, 827 F. Supp. at 7. 
42. "Dunning letters" is a slang term used by the FCC to describe the collection 
letters it sends to broadcasters. 
43. See Action for Childrens Television, 827 F. Supp. at 7. 
44. 47 U.S.C. § S04(a) (1996). In relevant part, § S04(a) states: 
The forfeitures provided for in this chapter shall be payable into the Treasury 
of the United States, and shall be recoverable ... in a civil suit in the name of 
the United States brought in the district where the person or carrier has its 
principal operating office .... It shall be the duty of the various United States 
attorneys ... to prosecute for the recovery of forfeitures under this chapter. 
Id. Therefore, forfeitures imposed by the Commission are recoverable only in a civil 
proceeding brought by the United States Attorneys in the district courts, unless pay­
ment is voluntarily made. See Pleasant Broad. Co. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 496, 498 (D.C. Cir. 
1977). 
4S. Although the FCC, as a regulatory agency, does have executive, legislative 
and judicial functions, it does not provide broadcasters with an administrative adjudica­
tive process with review before an administrative law judge of forfeiture fines for alleg­
edly "indecent" material. See Seth T. Goldsamt, "Crucified by the FCC?" Howard 
Stern, the FCC, and Selective Prosecution, 28 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 203, 204 
(1995). See generally PETER L. STRAUSS, ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 45 (9th ed. 
1995). To the contrary, these fines are determined solely by the Commission members. 
See supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Commissioners' 
forfeiture determination process. Broadcasters' appeals to this point are limited to the 
opportunity to submit an opposition to the NAL, thereby attempting to persuade the 
FCC to drop its indecency charges. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text for a 
discussion of the NAL procedure. The FCC does, however, offer adjudicatory hearings 
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C. Forfeiture Enforcement Scheme-In Practice 
Although the forfeiture enforcement scheme may seem quite 
arduous, in practice most broadcasters that are assessed forfeitures 
for indecency violations pay the forfeitures shortly after the issu­
ance of an NAL.47 To date, no broadcaster has gone to trial on the 
merits of an FCC indecency determination.48 Of the thirty-six FCC 
indecency forfeiture orders issued since 1987, not one has been re­
viewed by a court.49 The incentive for the broadcaster to pay the 
fine quickly and release itself from review by the FCC is evidenced 
by the time delays inherent in the FCC's forfeiture enforcement 
scheme. The FCC takes between six and twenty-three months to 
issue the final forfeiture order, with the average wait for a final or­
der being eleven months.50 Once the forfeiture order becomes fi­
nal, the broadcaster waits another period of time, no longer than 
five years from the date the claim accrued,51 before a United States 
Attorney files suit to enforce the order, precipitating judicial 
review.52 
Further, if the broadcaster refuses to pay the fine and instead 
allows the FCC to file a collection action against it, the FCC can 
before an administrative law judge for nonconstitutional issues, such as licensing and 
licensing renewal disputes. See CARTER, supra note 26, at 501; STRAUSS, supra at 45. 
46. In Action for Children's Television, Infinity Broadcasting, Inc. was able to 
challenge the forfeiture in federal court more quickly because it was challenging the 
constitutionality of the forfeiture enforcement scheme as applied to individual broad­
casters, and not the indecency of the speech. It was therefore not required to exhaust 
the entire FCCforfeiture sc~eme prior to the institution of an action in court. See infra 
Part III for a detailed description of the Action for Children's Television case. 
47. See Action for Childrens Television, 827 F. Supp. at 7. 
48. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). 
49. See id. at 1264. "To date, only two broadcasters have refused to pay [the] 
forfeitures imposed for indecent broadcasts after the FCC has exhausted its dunning 
letter[s] procedures." Action for Childrens Television, 827 F. Supp. at 7. The FCC has 
asked the United States Attorney to file collection proceedings against them. See id. at 
8. 
50. See Action for Childrens Television, 827 F. Supp. at 8. During that time, the 
broadcaster must refrain from any further re-broadcasts of the disputed material or 
subject itself to increased forfeiture amounts. See infra, notes 143-49 and accompany­
ing text for a discussion of the repercussions a broadcaster must face for subsequent 
airings of the material. 
51. The United States Attorney must file the collection proceeding against the 
broadcaster within five years from the date the claim accrued. See Action for Children's 
Television, 827 F. Supp. at 8. 
52. See id. This lengthy delay is the product of the FCC's administrative process. 
See supra notes 50-51 for a discussion of the delays inherent in the FCC's forfeiture 
enforcement scheme. See also infra notes 244-48 for a discussion of the FCC's lengthy 
delays in issuing NALs against broadcasters. 
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attempt to revoke a broadcaster's license or block a proposed ac­
quisition.53 A broadcaster is also subject to additional fines for 
each re-broadcast of the material while the case is pending.54 These 
fines are typically as high as $2,000-5,000 for each infraction, but are 
permitted to be as high as $25,000 for each day of the disputed ma­
terial's airing. 55 
The forfeiture proceeding has no checks on the duration of the 
procedure. For instance, there is no regulation that imposes time 
limits on the FCC's processing of complaints, that requires expedit­
ing such processing, or that requires expeditious filing of forfeiture 
actions by the Commission.56 Therefore, unless a broadcaster im­
mediately pays its forfeiture and complies with the FCC's indecency 
determination, it will be subject to a lengthy and cumbersome list of 
procedures it must follow in order to obtain judicial review of the 
challenged material. 57 Such a pro~ess effectively encourages the 
broadcasters to pay the forfeiture and lay the matter to rest. 
D. 	 The Enforcement Scheme as Applied-FCC v. Pacifica 
Foundation58 
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court examined the FCC 
enforcement scheme for the first time. 59 In Pacifica, the Court had 
an opportunity to review both the FCC's enforcement scheme as 
applied to a broadcaster, as well as whether the FCC could restrict 
nonobscene speech under its power to proscribe. "indecent" mate­
rial. The facts in Pacifica centered around a father who, while driv­
ing with his young son,60 heard the broadcast of George Carlin's 
53.. See also infra notes 197-200 for a discussion of FCC tactics. Fu~thef' the FCC 
may "revoke any station license or construction permit" for indecency reasons. 47 
U.S.c. § 312 (1996). 
54. See 47 U.S.c.§ 503(b)(2)(A); see also supra note 34 (detailing the contents of 
47 U.S.c. § 503(b)(2)(A) and its application to broadcasters by the FCC). 
55. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1254 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). See also supra note 34 for a discussion of the permissible forfeiture fine 
amounts. 
56. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1254. , 
57. See Pleasant Broad. Corp. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 496, 500 (D.C. Cir. 1977) 
("[S]ection 504(a) by its terms makes no provisions for initiation of judicial review by 
persons subjected to forfeiture orders ... but ... it clearly provides such persons with 
an opportunity to obtain full review of the Commission's findings, in a trial de novo in 
the district court, in the proceeding which the Government must bring if it wishes to 
collect the fine."). 
58. 438 U.S. 726 (1978). 
59. To date, there has been no subsequent Supreme Court review of the FCC's 
forfeiture enforcement scheme. . . 
60. There is speculation that the complainant was not riding in his car with his 
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"Filthy Words" monologue,61 which listed and repeated a number 
of words you could not say on the public airwaves.62 The father 
filed a complaint with the FCC, who forwarded the complaint to the 
broadcaster.63 After receiving a response,64 the Commission then 
issued a declaratory order holding that Pacifica65 "could have been 
the subject of administrative sanction."66 Although the FCC did 
not impose formal sanctions, such as forfeiture fines, it did indicate 
that the order "would be 'associated with the station's license file, 
and in the event that subsequent complaints are received, the Com­
mission will then decide whether it should utilize any of the avail­
able sanctions it has been granted by Congress.' "67 
The broadcaster filed suit in the United States Court of Ap­
young son, but was rather a member of a conservative advocacy group which monitors 
the public airwaves in search of material it finds indecent. The complaint was made by 
a Florida resident who was a member of the national planning board of Morality in the 
Media. His "young son" who was with him when he heard the monologue was fifteen 
years old. See LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 18, at 42. 
61. The monologue's full introduction was "Seven Dirty Words That You Defi­
nitely Wouldn't Say on the Public Airwaves." Carlin proceeded to repeat continuously 
these seven dirty words in order to make a statement about contemporary society's 
attitudes toward language. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 730; Kristin A. Finch, Comment, 
Lights, Camera, and Action for Children's Television v. FCC: The Story of Broadcast 
Indecency, Starring Howard Stern, 63 U. CINN. L. REv. 1275, 1286 nn.54-55 (1992). The 
FCC used these seven "dirty words" (shit, piss, fuck, motherfucker, cocksucker, cunt 
and tits) as its standard for determining indecency in broadcasting after the Pacifica 
case until 1987, when the FCC adopted a more generic standard of indecency. Under 
this new standard, language is indecent if it describes '~in terms patently offensive as 
measured by contemporary community standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or 
excretory activities or organ[s], when ... there is a reasonable risk that children may be 
in the audience." See New Indecency Enforcement Standards, 2 F.C.C.R. 2726 (1987); 
see also Jay A. Gayoso, The FCC's Regulation of Broadcast Indecency: A Broadened 
Approach for Removing Immorality from the Airwaves, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV. 871 
(1989) (discussing the FCC's abrupt change from its narrow "seven dirty words" stan­
dard of indecency to its current "broad standard"); Goldsamt, supra note 45, at 203 
(discussing the evolution of the indecency standard from the "seven dirty words" to the 
new generic standard); Lili Levi, The Hard Case of Broadcast Indecency, 20 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 49 (1992) (discussing and contrasting the narrow "seven dirty 
words" standard of indecency with the new generic standard and the chilling effect the 
FCC's new definition has on broadcast speech). 
62. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729-30. 
63. See id. at 730. 
64. See supra Part I.B-C for a discussion of the procedures used by the FCC in 
issuing forfeitures. 
65. Pacifica Foundation was the owner and operator of several radio stations lo­
cated in New York. See Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729. 
66. Id. at 730. Since the FCC determined that Pacifica was not subject to formal 
administrative sanctions, the FCC was not required to follow the administrative proce­
dures mandated in its forfeiture enforcement scheme, as set forth in Part I.B-C. 
67. Id. (citation omitted). 
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peals for the District of Columbia, arguing that the Carlin mono­
logue was not obscene because it did not appeal to any prurient 
interest and because it had literary and political value. Therefore, 
the broadcaster argued, the material was entitled to constitutional 
protection.68 After the Commission's decision was reversed by the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir­
cuit, the Commission filed a petition for certiorari, which the 
Supreme Court granted.69 In granting review, the Court limited its 
consideration to two issues: (1) whether the Commission's actions 
were forbidden "censorship" within the meaning of 47 U.S.c. § 326, 
and (2) whether speech that concededly was not obscene could be 
restricted as "indecent" under the authority of 18 U.S.c. § 1464.70 
In its plurality opinion, the Court71 stated that although it would 
indeed be "censorship" if the Commission denied the broadcaster 
permission to air material prior to its release, it is not "censorship" 
to review completed broadcasts aired by the broadcasters while 
performing its regulatory duties.72 As to the second issue for re­
view, the plurality held that no sound basis existed to challenge the 
FCC's conclusion that the broadcast contained indecentJanguage.73 
Thereafter, the plurality addressed whether the First Amend­
ment denied the government any power to restrict the public broad­
cast of indecent language in any circumstances.74 The plurality 
stated that both the content and the context of the speech are criti­
cal elements when applying a First Amendment analysis.75 In 
Pacifica, the plurality found the content of the plaintiff's broadcast 
to be "'vulgar,' 'offensive,' and 'shocking.' "76 Because of the na­
ture of the speech, the plurality held tha~ such content was not enti­
68. Because Pacifica Foundation was filing a constitutional challenge to the 
FCC's statutory scheme, claiming a First Amendment violation by the FCC, it was not 
forced to exhaust the FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme prior to receiving judicial 
review. 
69. See id. 
70. Id. at 735. See also supra note 21 for the text of 18 U.S.c. § 1464. 
71. Justice Stevens announced the Court's plurality opinion regarding the central 
constitutional issue in the case. Justice Powell filed an opinion concurring in part and 
concurring in the judgment, in which Justice Blackmun joined. See infra note 77 for a 
discussion of Justice Powell's opinion. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting opinion in 
which Justice Marshall joined. See infra note 79 for a discussion of Justice Brennan's 
opinion. Justice Stewart filed a dissenting opinion in which Justice Brennan and Justice 
Marshall joined. 
72. Pacifica, 438 u.S. at 735-36. 
73. See id. at 741. 
74. See id. at 744. 
75. See id. 
76. Id. at 747. 
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tled to absolute protection under the Constitution in all 
circumstances.77 Thus, the context must be examined to determine 
whether the Commission's action was permissible under the Consti­
tution.78 The plurality said that "of all forms of communication, it 
is broadcasting that has received the most limited First Amendment 
protection."79 If the FCC determines that depriving a broadcaster 
of its license or its forum furthers "the public interest, convenience 
and necessity," it may do SO.80 
In treating the broadcast medium differently from other medi­
ums of expression, the plurality stressed that 
the broadcast media h~ve established a uniquely pervasive pres­
ence in the lives of all Americans. . . . [I]ndecent material 
presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in 
public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual's 
right to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment 
rights of an intruder.81 
Because the listener is constantly changing· stations and tuning in 
and out, the plurality stated that a system of prior warnings would 
be ineffective.82 Turning off the offensive program after already 
having listened to offensive material being aired is "like saying that 
the remedy for an assault is to run away after the first blow."83 
77. See id. at 747-48. Justice·Powell, however, in his partial concurrence, did not 
subscribe to the th~ory that the Justices are free to generally decide, on the basis of its 
content, which speech is most valuable and therefore deserving of the most protection, 
and whieh is less valuable and hence deserving of less protection. Here, Justice Powell 
noted, the result should turn not on the value of Carlin's monologue, but instead on the 
unique characteristics of the broadcast medium, combined with society's right to protect 
children from speech which may be inappropriate for them. See id. at 761-62 (Powell, 
J., concurring). 
78. See id. at 748. 
79. Id. However, Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion argued that the Court's 
opinion ignored the constitutionally protected interest of both those who wish to trans­
mit and those who desire to receive broadcasts that many find offensive. Because the 
radio is such a public medium, an individual's actions in turning it on and listening to it 
should be viewed as a decision to take part in an ongoing public discourse. The listener, 
having chosen to receive public airwaves, can easily choose to change the channel or 
turn off the radio if confronted with an offensive program. See id. at 765 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). For arguments in support of Justice Brennan's opinion, see Matthew L. 
Spitzer, The Constitutionality of Licensing Broadcasters, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 990, 1023 
(1989) (arguing that a person must choose to bring a television into their home and turn 
it on in order to receive a broadcast; similarly, a printed publication will not ordinarily 
be delivered to the home. unless it is first ordered). 
80. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748. 
81. Id. 
82. See id. 
83. Id. at 749. 
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Therefore, according to Pacifica, the broadcast medium re­
ceives limited First Amendment protection.84 Consequently, gov­
ernment agencies such as the FCC have greater discretion III 
regulating the content of expression in this particular medium. 
II. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AS ApPLIED TO INFRINGEMENTS 
OF FIRST AMENDMENT FREEDOMS: A DIFFERENT 
STANDARD? 
Due to the growing impact of governmental agency regulatory 
and enforcement schemes upon First Amendment freedoms, the 
courts have constructed "a body of procedural law which defines 
the manner in which they and other bodies must evaluate and re­
solve First Amendment claims."85 In the context of regulatory and 
enforcement schemes, the protection of the First Amendment free­
dom of speech, and review of infringements thereof, is no longer 
limited to "substantive"86 due process review.87 Rather, courts 
have recognized that "procedural"88 due process plays an equally 
important role in the protection of First Amendment freedoms.89 
The Supreme Court has developed a scheme of "procedural 
safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of a censorship sys-. 
tem."90 These procedural protections only attach to schemes which 
84. See id. at 748. 
85. Henry P. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REv. 518, 
518 (1970). 
86. Substantive due process analysis begins by determining whether the possible 
infringement involves a nonfundamental right or a fundamental right. Generally, a 
non fundamental right will be reviewed according to a minimum scrutiny test: the regu­
lation will be presumed valid if it bears a rational relationship to the end sought. A 
possible infringement of a fundamental right, however, will be subject to strict scrutiny 
review: the possible infringement will be held invalid unless it is necessary to achieve a 
compelling governmental interest. A "fundamental right" is determined by looking at 
whether the right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition." Washington 
v. Glucksburg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2260 (1997). A right is fundamental when it is "so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people" that a fair and enlightened sys­
tem of justice would be impossible without this right. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97, 105 (1934). 
87. See Monaghan, supra note 85, at 518. 
88. Procedural due process requires that liberty and property interests not be im­
paired without some form of notice and hearing or an opportunity to be heard. See 
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569-70 (1972). "Before a person is deprived of 
a protected interest, he must be afforded opportunity for some kind of hearing, except 
for extraordinary situations where some valid governmental interest is at stake that 
justifies postponing the hearing until after the event." Id. at 570 n.7. 
89. See Monaghan, supra note 85, at 519. 
90. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1965). 
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effect an unconstitutional prior restraint91 on speech. Prior re­
straints which do not satisfy strict scrutiny review are considered 
constitutionally impermissible because of the "chilling"92 effect they 
have on speech.93 Such restraints on speech limit public debate be­
cause of the deterrent effect they may have on speakers, who may, 
as a result of the prior restraint, be inhibited from placing their 
ideas or speech in the "marketplace of ideas."94 
Rather than apply the traditional requirements of substantive 
due process analysis95 to determinations of obscenity, the Court 
uses a "different standard" which includes determining whether or 
not "the [governmental] procedure[s] show 'the necessary sensitiv­
ity to freedom of expression' "96 and do not effect a prior restraint 
on the First Amendment freedom of expression without adequate 
procedural protections.97 The following cases illustrate the devel­
91. The prior restraint doctrine requires that any government action which has 
the effect of a prior restraint on speech must be subject to strict judicial scrutiny. See 
Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of 
Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1989). It was developed to prevent infringements 
upon First Amendment freedoms by procedures which may effectively "chill" these 
freedoms before judicial review may be obtained. Id. at 2. "[L]aws identif[ying] prior 
restraints accurately can be characterized as: (1) having a greater chilling effect on po­
tential speech; (2) subjecting a wider spectrum of speech to official scrutiny; (3) sup­
pressing speech at significantly less cost; and (4) encouraging greater speech 
suppression than laws in the form of subsequent sanctions." /d. at 3. 
The Supreme Court first coined the phrase "prior restraint" in Near v. Minnesota, 
283 U.S. 697 (1931). In Near, the publisher of a newspaper charged with publishing 
malicious, scandalous and defamatory articles about local citizens was enjoined by the 
district court, with the court of appeals affirming, from publishing the newspaper per­
manently, adjudging it to be a "public nuisance." Id. at 706. The Supreme Court re­
versed, stating that the chief purpose of the First Amendment was to prevent previous 
restraints on its included freedoms. See id. at 713. Subsequent punishments (such as 
fines) for abuses of the press are the appropriate remedy, not prior restraints. See id. at 
720. 
92. See supra note 9 for a brief definition and discussion of "chilling" effects on 
speech. 
93. See Edward Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 
66 MINN. L. REv. 171, 185 (1981); Scordato, supra note 91, at 5. "The liberty of the 
press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no 
previous restraints upon publication, and not in freedom from censure for criminal mat­
ters when published." Id. 
94. See Blasi, supra note 93, at 185. 
95. See supra note 86 for a discussion of the requirements of substantive due 
process analysis. 
96. Monaghan, supra note 85, at 519 (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 
51, 58 (1965)). 
97. Even when the government claims the speech it is regulating is obscene, and 
therefore outside the protection of the First Amendment, procedural protections are 
necessary. Unless adequate procedures protect against the possibility that protected 
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opment of this unusual standard of procedural due process review, 
referred to herein as First Amendment Procedural Review, within 
the context of infringements of First Amendment rights. 
A. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan98 
In Bantam, the Rhode Island legislature created a commission 
dedicated to the eradication within the state of any book containing 
obscene, indecent or impure language ("book commission").99 The 
book commission typically would notify a distributor that certain 
books that it distributed were "objectionable" for sale, distribution, 
or display to youths under age eighteen. The book commission's 
notices requested the "cooperation" of distributors in the cessation 
of sales of such materia1.1Oo Further, the notices advised the 
distributors that the book commission sent copies of lists of "objec­
tionable" publications to local police departments with recommen­
dations that sellers of obscenity should be prosecuted.1OI 
Four out-of-state publishers of books distributed in Rhode Is­
land sued for a declaratory judgment that the law authorizing the 
book commission was unconstitutiona1.102 The publishers argued 
that the book commission's activities amounted to a scheme of gov­
ernmental censorship devoid of any constitutionally required safe­
guards for state regulation of obscenity.I03 This resulted in an 
abridgement of the publishers' First Amendment liberties protected 
by the Fourteenth AmendmentlO4 from infringement by the 
states. lOS 
The Supreme Court held that under the Fourteenth Amend­
ment, the States, in regulating obscenity, must not arbitrarily sup­
press protected speech.106 Rather, the Court concluded that 
speech will be wrongly characterized as obscene, important Fust Amendment rights will 
be jeopardized. 
98. 372 U.S. 58 (1963). 
99. See id. at 59-60. 
100. See id. at 62. 
101. See id. at 62-63. 
102. See id. at 61. 
103. See id. at 64. 
104. The Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
105. See Bantam, 372 U.S. at 64. 
106. See id. at 65-66. 
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regulations of obscenity must contain procedures necessary to pre­
vent suppression of constitutionally protected expression.107 There­
fore, regulations of obscenity must include the most rigorous 
procedural safeguards.108 Although the book commission argued 
that it did not regulate or suppress obscenity, but instead advised 
booksellers of their legal rights, the Court noted that the book com­
mission's acts and practices effectively stopped the circulation of 
publications in many parts of the state.109 
While the publisher was free to ignore the book commission's 
nonbinding notices, the Court stated that "[p]eople do not lightly 
disregard public officers' thinly veiled threats to institute criminal 
proceedings against them if they do not come around. "110 
Although the book commission was limited to informal sanctions 
which included the threat of invoking legal sanctions and other 
means of coercion, intimidation, or persuasion, the Court found 
these actions to constitute informal censorshipll1 by inhibiting the 
circulation of possibly protected publications.112 What the state 
had done, the Court concluded, was subject the distributors of these 
publications to a system of prior restraints.113 
In evaluating the effect of the censorship, the Court held that 
the book commission's practices provided no safeguards against the 
suppression of non-obscene and constitutionally protected mate­
rial.114 Rather, Rhode Island subjected the distribution of publica­
tions to a system of new administrative restraints.us The Court 
107. See id. at 66. 
108. See id. 
109. See id. at 66-68. 
110. [d. at 68. 
111. Justice Harlan's dissenting opinion noted that the book commission's activi­
ties with respect to intimidation and coercion exceeded constitutional limits. However, 
he stated that the book commission was formed with the admirable intention of com­
batting juvenile delinquency, a troubling social problem which overrides the majority's 
considerations of the right of freedom of expression under the First Amendment. Be­
cause of this compelling state interest, the dissent argued that people's free speech con­
cerns should give way. See id. at 76-78 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
112. See id. at 67. 
113. See Bantam, 372 U.S. at 70-72. Although the Court determined that the 
book commission's actions constituted a system of prior restraints, these actions were in 
fact technically subsequent punishments, as they punished the publisher for past con­
duct and did not expressly bar any future expressive activity. See infra Part IV.A.l for 
a discussion of subsequent punishments and prior restraints, and Part IV.A.2 for an 
analysis of the Bantam Court's characterization of the book commission's actions as 
prior restraints on expression. 
114. See id. at 70. 
115. See id. 
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arrived at this conclusion by noting that, since the book commission 
was not a judicial body, its decisions to list particular publications as 
objectionable were not the result of judicial determinations that 
such publications could lawfully be barred.1l6 The Court continued, 
stating that "[a]ny system of prior restraints of expression comes to 
this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional 
validity."1l7 
The Court stated that the book commission's practices pro­
vided no safeguards whatsoever against the suppression of nonob­
scene, and therefore constitutionally protected material.1l8 In 
order for the book commission practices to be held constitutionally 
valid, its scheme must have contained a saving feature, such as 
prompt judicial review of the book commission's determinations of 
"objectionable" material.1l9 
B. Freedman v. Maryland120 
In Freedman, the Supreme Court relied heavily on its Bantam 
decision, effectively broadening the scope of the "prior restraint"121 
doctrine to include the theory that any restraint prior to judicial 
review must be limited to preservation of the status quo and for the 
shortest period compatible with sound judicial procedure.122 In 
Freedman, a theater owner in the state of Maryland challenged the 
constitutionality of a Maryland motion picture censorship statute 
that required theaters to submit films for approval and license by 
the Maryland State Board of Censors prior to exhibition.123 The 
theater owner argued that the Maryland statute constituted an inva­
lid prior restraint because it presented "a danger of unduly sup­
pressing protected expression."124 
The theater owner further argued that the Maryland statute 
lacked sufficient safeguards for confining the Board of Censor's ac­
116. See id. 
117. Id. 
118. See id. at 70-71. 
119. See id. at 71. 
120. 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
121. See supra note 91 for a discussion of the prior restraint doctrine. 
122. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 59. 
123. See id. at 52. The statute in dispute provided: "[i]t shall be unlawful to ... 
exhibit ... any motion picture film or view in the State of Maryland unless the said film 
or view has been submitted ... and duly approved and licensed by the Maryland State 
Board of Censors." MD. ANN. CODE art. 66A, § 2 (1957). 
124. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 54. 
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tions to judicially determined constitutional limits.125 The Court 
agreed, stating that, "under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is 
not free to adopt whatever procedures it pleases for dealing with 
obscenity ... without regard to the possible consequences for con­
stitutionally protected speech."126 The Court then noted that be­
cause it is "the Censor's job to censor," there is a risk that he may 
be less sensitive to the constitutionally protected interests in free 
expression than a court.127 
In holding that the prior submission of a film to a censorship 
board avoids constitutional infirmity only if there are adequate pro­
cedural safeguards designed to obviate the dangers of censorship 
and the imposition of a prior restraint on expression, the Supreme 
Court set forth three constitutionally required procedural safe­
guards. First, the censor has the burden of instituting judicial pro­
ceedings, because only judicial review ensures the necessary 
sensitivity to First Amendment concerns.128 Second, the burden of 
proving the expression is unprotected must rest on the censorP9 
Third, the procedure must guarantee a prompt final judicial deci­
sion.130 The Court held that "the procedure must also assure a 
prompt final judicial decision, to minimize the deterrent effect of an 
125. See id. at 57. 
126. Id. (quoting Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961)). 
127. Id. at 57-58; see also Times Film Corp. v. City of Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 67-68 
(1961) (noting that a censor is beholden to those who sponsor the creation of his office, 
and will invariably tend toward restraint). See generally William T. Mayton, Toward a 
Theory ofFirst Amendment Process: Injunctions ofSpeech, Subsequent Punishment, and 
the Costs of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 245, 254-57 (1982) (argu­
ing that the harm of a statute's administrator's insensitivity to First Amendment values 
is multiplied by the characteristically vague standard that he enforces); Monaghan, 
supra note 85, at 518 (arguing that because the First Amendment due process cases 
have shown that First Amendment rights are fragile and can be destroyed by insensitive 
procedures, courts must thoroughly evaluate every aspect of the procedural system that 
protects those rights); Alison Gail Adolph, Comment, First Amendment and Licenses to 
Sell Sexually Oriented Material-FWfPBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. 
REv. 828 (1990) (arguing that regulations promulgated by such officials may not cir­
cumvent the required procedural safeguards available to businesses engaged in activi­
ties protected by the First Amendment); Allan Tananbaum, Note, "New and 
Improved": Procedural Safeguards for Distinguishing Commercial from Noncommercial 
Speech, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1821, 1825 (1988) (arguing that governmental agencies em­
powered to restrain speech tend inexorably toward restraint because the reason for 
these agencies' existence is to root out violations that they are mandated to enforce). 
128. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. The Freedman Court stated that the govern­
ment must bear the burden of instituting judicial proceedings and of proving that the 
material is unprotected. See id. 
129. See id. 
130. See id. at 59. 
261 1998] INDECENCY FINES 
interim and possibly erroneous denial of a license."l3l Without 
these safeguards, the Court noted, those aggrieved may find the 
procedure too burdensome to seek review of the censor's 
findings. 132 
Bantam and Freedman establish the constitutionally mandated 
procedures necessary to avoid violations of the First Amendment 
by governmental agencies and entities administering prior restraint 
schemes. In Bantam, the Supreme Court held that in order to be 
constitutionally valid, a prior restraint must contain rigorous proce­
dural safeguards, such as prompt judicial review, to ensure against 
abridgement of First Amendment protections.133 The Freedman 
Court later refined and expanded this Bantam holding, resulting in 
the creation of three specific requirements for a constitutionally 
permissible prior restraint. First, a government agency's enforce­
ment scheme must contain the most rigorous procedural safeguards 
available to ensure against abridgement of First Amendment pro­
tections.134 Second, these procedural safeguards must include 
prompt judicial review of the challenged material.135 Lastly, the 
burden of proving that the expression is unprotected by the Consti­
tution, as well as the burden of instituting proceedings, must be on 
the censor.136 With these standards, herein termed First Amend­
ment Procedural Review, as its backdrop, the United States Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit decided Action for 
Children's Television v. FCC.B7 
III. A CTION FOR CHILDREN's TELEVISION v. FC038 
A. Factual Setting 
Broadcasters and organizations representing the interests of 
listeners and viewers139 filed suit against the FCC challenging the 
131. Id. 
132. See id. 
133. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1962). 
134. See Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. 
135. See id. at 71. 
136. See id. at 58. 
137. 59 F.3d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
138. See id. 
139. The parties included: Action for Children's Television; the American Civil 
Liberties Union; the Association of Independent Television Stations, Inc.; Evergreen 
Media Corporation; EZ Communications, Inc.; Fox Broadcasting Company, Inc.; 
Greater Media, Inc.; Infinity Broadcasting Corp.; the Motion Picture Association of 
America, Inc.; the National Association of Broadcasters; the National Association of 
College Broadcasters; National Public Radio; People for the American Way; Post­
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procedures under which the FCC imposed indecency forfeitures on 
broadcasters.l40 The complaint by the broadcasters and organiza­
tions alleged that the forfeiture scheme imposed by the FCC consti­
tuted a system of censorship.without prompt judicial review.141 
Upon challenge by the FCC that the plaintiffs lacked standing, 
the district court determined that only one of the plaintiffs, Infinity 
Broadcasting Corp. ("Infinity"), had the proper standing to file 
suit.142 Infinity was the employer and producer of notorious radio 
"Shock-Jock" Howard Stern.143 Over the past several years, as the 
result of complaints from the listening public, the FCC fined Infin­
ity a total of $1.7 million for indecency violations by Howard 
Stern's morning. program.144 Refusing to pay these forfeiture 
Newsweek Stations, Inc.; the Public Broadcasting Service; the Radio-Television News 
Directors Association; Shamrock Broadcasting, Inc.; the Society of Professional Jour­
nalists; South Fork Broadcasting Corporation; and Twentieth Century Fox Film Corpo­
ration. See id. 
140. See Action for Childrens Television v. FCC, 827 F. Supp. 4, 9 (D.D.C. 1993). 
141. See id. at 4, 9. 
142. See id. at 14. The court found that "the forfeiture procedures could not be 
'asserted by the public as procedural error.''' Id. at 12 (quoting Illinois Citizens Comm. 
for Broad. v. FCC, 515 F.2d 397 (D.C. Cir. 1975». Therefore, the organization repre­
senting the listeners and viewers lacked standing. The FCC further challenged the 
broadcasting plaintiffs that had not been involved in a forfeiture proceeding. These 
plaintiffs, the FCC contended, suffered no injury from these forfeiture proceedings, and 
therefore lacked standing to request relief. The court agreed. See id. at 13. The court 
determined, however, that Infinity had a forfeiture proceeding still in progress at the 
time of the suit, and that the FCC had "signaled its willingness to apply its forfeiture 
regulations to the detriment of Infinity" as it' had already imposed' a final forfeiture 
order against Infinity. Id. at 15. 
143. For a complete analysis and description of Howard Stem's relationship to 
Infinity and his "Indecent broadcast" battle with the FCC, see Finch, supra note 61. 
144. See FCC Get New Complaints on Shock Jock, Howard Stern, ASSOCIATED 
PREss, Mar. 17, 1994; available in 1994 WL 10128308. Howard Stem was cited for talk­
ing about "testicles," "homos," "lesbians," and "sodomy." Infinity Broad., 2 F.C.C.R. 
2705, 2706 (Apr. 29, 1987). He was also cited for using the words "penis," "wiener," 
and "masturbate." Letter to Mr. Mel Karmazin, President, Sagittarius Broad. Corp., 8 
F.C.C.R. 2688 (Dec. 18, 1992). "The Stem broadcast ... made frequent, explicit, pa­
tently offensive references to sexual intercourse, orgasm, masturbation, and other sex­
ual conduct, as well as to breasts, nUdity, and male and female genitalia." Liability of 
Sagittarius Broad. Corp., 7 F.C.C.R 6873 (Oct. 23,,1992). 
Infinity, in its response to the LOI it had received from the Commission, argued 
that the Stem material consisted of isolated words and phrases that were "in and of 
themselves innocuous," and did not fall within the FCC's indecency definition because 
they were not descriptive of sexual or·excretory activities or organs. Id. Infinity further 
cited several other broadcast indecency cases that the Commission had determined 
were not actionable, arguing that the Stem excerpts were no worse, and even more 
innocuous than the other broadcasts that had been determined to be not offensive. See 
id. 
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amounts, Infinity challenged these fines in federal court.145 
Because of Infinity's refusal to pay these fines, the FCC consid­
ered drastic actions in order to force Infinity's compliance. For ex­
ample, the Commission considered revoking Infinity's broadcasting 
license.146 In addition, the Commission notified Infinity that it 
planned to levy a $600,000 forfeiture on it for allegedly "indecent" 
broadcasts and based this unusually large fine on "'the apparent 
pattern of indecent broadcasting exhibited by Infinity over a sub­
stantial period since our initial indecency warning.' "147 The Com­
mission also considered blocking Infinity's acquisition of several 
stations,148 but because of Infinity's acquiescence in deciding to 
cease further broadcasts of the allegedly indecent material, the 
Commission allowed the acquisition to take place.149 
Infinity claimed that the indecency forfeiture process violated 
145. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1249 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). Because Infinity, in filing this action, was filing a constitutional challenge to the 
FCC's statutory scheme claiming First Amendment violations by the FCC, Infinity was 
not forced to exhaust the FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme prior to receiving its 
day in court. Infinity first attempted to challenge the FCC's determinations of "inde­
cency," claiming that the material was not indecent and therefore was protected speech. 
See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc); 
Action for Children's Television v. FCC," 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (wherein 
broadcasters argued that the government cannot totally suppress indecent speech be­
cause it is protected by First Amendment); Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 852 
F.2d 1332 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (wherein broadcasters argued that FCC's definition was un­
constitutionally vague and overbroad). These "indecency" challenges, however, failed. 
Therefore, Infinity offered a second challenge to the constitutionality of the FCC's en­
forcement scheme-it effects a prior restraint on protected speech without prompt judi­
cial review. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1250; Action for Childrens 
Television, 827 F. Supp. at 6. 
146. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1266; see also Goldsamt, 
supra note 45, at 204. 
147. See id. at 1266 (quoting Letter to Mr. Mel Karmazin, President, Sagittarius 
Broad. Corp., 8 F.C.C.R. at 2689). 
148. See FCC May Not Block Infinity's Acquisition, BALT. SUN, Jan. 29, 1994, at 
010; see also Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1266. FCC Commissioner 
James H. Quello stated "[t]he position of egregious repeated violations of FCC inde­
cency rules is so flagrantly aggravated by six new complaints against Infinity and How­
ard Stem that I am impelled to dissent ... to ... approving additional 'stations for 
Infinity .... It is apparent that previous FCC fines have not had a deterrent effect." 
Statement of FCC Commissioner James H. Quello, 1994 FCC LEXIS 1110 (March 17, 
1994). 
149. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1266. The proposed acquisi­
tion included over $275 million in station purchases. Infinity agreed to pay the $1.7 
million settlement in order to clear the -record. BROADCASTING & CABLE, Sept. 25, 
1995, at 11; see also LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 18 at 2 (noting that Infinity agreed to 
"'alert all on-air personnel to the federal law prohibiting the broadcast of indecent 
speech,'" despite its previous stance of vowing to fight the regulation on First Amend­
ment grounds) (citation omitted). 
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the First and Fifth Amendments because it constituted a system of 
censorship without prompt judicial review.150 The district court 
granted the FCC's motion for summary judgment.151 Plaintiffs ap­
pealed152 this decision to the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit.153 
B. 	 Opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the District 
of Columbia Circuit 
1. 	 Majority Opinion 
The court of appeals observed that once an action is timely 
filed, there is no limit on the amount of time that may pass before 
the case is actually tried.154 The broadcaster could feasibly wait as 
long as five years from the time a program was aired to its first 
opportunity for judicial review of the Commission's decision that 
the material was indecent.155 
Infinity argued that the delay inherent in the FCC's forfeiture 
scheme allowed the Commission to take action against broadcasters 
without affording them procedural safeguards necessary to avoid 
infringement of their First Amendment rights.156 The forfeiture 
scheme essentially operated as a system of "informal censor­
ship."157 To buttress its claim, Infinity relied heavily on Bantam.15S 
Infinity attempted to draw a parallel between prior restraints on the 
print medium and the effects on speech resulting from the FCC's 
enforcement scheme. The FCC, Infinity argued, forced broadcast­
ers to remove both protected and unprotected material from the 
airwaves because the broadcasters attempted to conform their con­
duct to perceived FCC standards.159 This was analogous, Infinity 
said, to the book commission's scheme in Bantam, which forced dis­
150. 	 See Action for Children's Television, 827 F. Supp. 4, 9 (D.D.C. 1993). 
151. See id. at 19-20. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co­
lumbia Circuit's decision on appeal is substantially similar to that of the district court's 
decision. Therefore, a detailed discussion of the district court's decision has been 
omitted. 
152. The original plaintiffs appealed both the standing issue as well as the merits. 
See id. at 12-16. 
153. 	 See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1249. 
154. 	 See id. at 1254. 
155. See id. See also supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of 
such delays. 
156. 	 See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1255. 
157. 	 Id. 
158. See id. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the factual setting and the 
Court's opinion in Bantam. 
159. 	 See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1260-61. 
265 1998] INDECENCY FINES 
tributors to stop selling "objectionable" books out of fear of possi­
ble prosecution.160 
The court stated that Infinity's attempt to draw a parallel be­
tween the FCC's enforcement scheme as applied to Infinity and the 
book commission's prior restraint scheme in Bantam was mis­
guided.161 In the instant case, the broadcasters were essentially free 
to air what they wished. Only if what they aired turned out to vio­
late FCC guidelines did a penalty result.162 The court of appeals 
noted that here the penalty occurred after the fact, not prior 
thereto, and was therefore a permissible subsequent punishment 
and not a prior restraint.163 Further, the court stated that in Ban­
tam, the Supreme Court recognized that a scheme may also consti­
tute a prior restraint in effect, although specific materials are not 
subject to evaluation prior to publication.164 Therefore, the court of 
appeals noted that the proper inquiry is whether or not broadcast­
ers' attempts to conform their conduct to FCC standards are analo­
gous to Bantam's scheme that forced distributors to stop selling 
"objectionable" publications for fear of possible prosecution.165 
The court concluded that the two cases were not analogous in 
this respect. The FCC did nothing to actively discourage a broad­
caster from obtaining judicial review of the indecency forfeiture it 
had imposed.166 In Bantam, however, the book commission at­
tempted to regulate materials that could not be proscribed as ob­
scene.167 In fact, the FCC enforcement scheme provided for 
judicial review, whereas the Rhode Island book commission in Ban­
tam afforded the aggrieved publishers no such opportunity.168 
160. Id. at 1261. 
161. See id. 
162. See id. at 1260. 
"163. See id. Generally, a "subsequent punishment" is punishment for past con­
duct, effectively penalizing past speech. It is distinct from a prior restraint which bars 
speech in the future. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544,549 (1993). See also 
infra Part IV.A.l and accompanying text for a discussion of prior restraints and subse­
quent punishments. 
164. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1260-61. 
165. Id. at 1261. 
166. See id. "While the prospect of a forfeiture trial may understandably cause 
some broadcasters to forego judicial review of a Commission determination that a pro­
gram was indecent, we find no indication in this record that the FCC is taking the op­
portunity afforded thereby to impose unconstitutional restrictions upon broadcast 
speech." Id. 
167. See id. (citing Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 62 n.4 (1963». 
168. See id. In fact, however, the FCC's enforcement scheme did not technically 
provide for judicial review. Rather, it provided for a civil collection proceeding in dis­
trict court where the aggrieved broadcaster would obtain a trial de novo on all matters. 
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Some degree of self-censorship, the court noted, was not only inevi­
table, but desirable.169 "'At most [self-censorship] will deter only 
the broadcasting of patently offensive references to excretory and 
sexual organs and activities.' "170 Additionally, the court stated that 
if every determination of indecency must be judicial, the FCC will 
play no role in developing and enforcing Congress's policy of ban­
ning indecency from the airwaves.171 
Because the enforcement scheme already provided for judicial 
review, the court reasoned, nothing but the timing of judicial action 
would be different if Congress were to change the current enforce­
ment scheme to allow a court to review the forfeiture action imme­
diately after the airing of the allegedly indecent broadcast. l72 The 
delay is "of constitutional significance only if it burdens broadcast 
speech that is not indecent."173 Here, Infinity argued that the delay 
chills protected speech as well as indecent speech.174 The court, 
however, stated that Infinity failed to show that protected speech 
was being "chilled."175 
The court noted several additional factors which further distin­
guished the Commission's enforcement scheme from that of 
Bantam: 
(1) that [Bantam] concerned the printed word, which, unlike 
broadcasting, has historically enjoyed the broadest protection 
under the First Amendment; (2) the FCC, unlike the Rhode Is­
land Commission, gives a putative violator notice and an oppor­
tunity to respond to the charge against it; (3) the decisions of the 
FCC are subject to judicial review; and (4) the broadcaster. that 
would avoid a dispute with the FCC need only move its arguably 
indecent material to a different time of day, not refrain from 
broadcasting it altogetherP6 
The court concluded that a scheme is not unconstitutional ab-
See supra notes 36-46 and accompanying text for a discussion of the remedies the 
FCC's enforcement scheme provides a broadcaster who chooses to oppose its indecency 
forfeitures. 
169. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). 
170. /d. (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 (1978). 
171. See id. 




174. See id. 
175. Id. at 1261-62. 
176. Id. at 1262. The Action for Children's Television court relied on FCC v. 
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S; 726 (1978), for its statement that broadcasting enjoys lim­
ited First Amendment protection. See id. at 748. 
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sent a showing that nonindecent material is being forced off of the 
airP7 Here, the court noted, Infinity had failed to make any such 
showing.178 However, the court indicated that the delay inherent in 
the FCC's enforcement scheme was "troubling,"179 and noted sev­
eral additional factors which served to exacerbate the effects of the 
delay. First, a broadcaster who claims that a forfeiture is unconsti­
tutional "runs the risk of incurring an increased forfeiture for any 
subsequent indecency violation."18o Second, the individual commis­
sioners in the FCC take an active public role in criticizing the 
broadcasters who air what they consider indecent material.181 
Lastly, the Commission refused to issue a declaratory ruling on 
whether or not material is indecent.182 Therefore, "the only official 
guidance about the Commission's standards of decency available to 
a broadcaster is what can be gleaned from published NALs and for­
feitureorders. "183 . 
Nevertheless, the court emphasized ·that Infinity had two alter­
native avenues of relief which it could pursue to circumvent these 
harms. First, the court stated that 
the broadcaster could stipulate the facts giving rise to the Notice 
of Apparent Liability and state that it will not pay the forfeiture 
unless ordered to do so in district court; the Commission could 
then forward the matter to the Department of Justice immedi­
ately, so that the broadcaster could get a trial on the merits of the 
forfeiture relatively quickly.184 
A second alternative the court offered was that the broadcaster 
could bring a declaratory judgment action against the United States 
in district court.185 The court stated "a broadcaster that refrains 
from airing material that is not indecent because of a legitimate fear 
... that it would be subject to a forfeiture should in this way be able 
to promptly dispel any unwarranted chilling effect."186 Therefore, 
the court noted, a broadcaster is free to "prove up, in a specific 
case, the general claim that we adjudge deficient today."187 
177. See Action for Children's Television, 59F.3d at 1262. 
178. See id. at 1261-62. 
179. Id. at 126(). 
180. Id. at 1254. 
181. See id. at 1255. 
182. See id. 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 1262. 
185. See id. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
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2. Concurrence with Reservations: Judge Edwards 
While essentially concurring with the majority opinion, Judge 
Edwards pointed out that the majority's reliance on Pacifica was 
misplaced.188 Judge Edwards noted that Pacifica distinguished be­
tween the broadcast and cable media with respect to the application 
of the First Amendment.189 This distinction, he stated, has "no 
place in our constitutional jurisprudence. "190 
However, Judge Edwards noted that Infinity's claim that the 
FCC's delay in enforcing the statute allowed action against it with 
no procedural safeguards to prevent infringement of its First 
Amendment rights, "implicitly assumes that the regulation itself is 
constitutionally permissible."191 Judge Edwards agreed with the 
majority that Infinity simply could not prevail in this case because it 
had failed to demonstrate that nonindecent speech was being 
"chilled."192 
3. Dissenting Opinion of Judge Tatel 
Judge Tatel wrote that "the Commission's actual implementa­
tion of the statute is characterized by years of delay and a total lack 
of judicial review."193 He noted that not one forfeiture order had 
ever been reviewed by a court, and the orders typically take be­
tween two to seven years before they get to court at al1.194 Judge 
Tatel further argued that it was unclear "how anyone could show 
that nonindecent speech is unaffected by the forfeiture scheme, 
since an impartial, independent Article III court has never evalu­
ated any of the Commission's indecency decisions."195 
Even so, the dissent noted, the unconstitutionality of the forfei­
ture scheme turns mainly on the fact that it harbors the same proce­
dural inadequacies as the book commission's censorship scheme in 
Bantam.196 Here, Judge Tatel observed, the FCC uses coercion and 
intimidation similar to, if not worse than, that used by the book 
188. See id. at 1263 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
189. See id. (Edwards, J., concurring). 
190. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring). 
191. Id. (Edwards, J., concurring). 
192. Id. at 1263-64 (Edwards, J., concurring). 
193. Id. at 1264 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
194. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
195. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
196. See id. (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 67 (1963)). The 
Court in Bantam concluded that the Rhode Island book commission's scheme consti­
tuted informal censorship because of "informal sanctions-the threat of invoking legal 
sanctions and other means of coercion, persuasion, and intimidation." Bantam, 372 
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commission in Bantam.197 "[T]he FCC threatens to increase fines, 
revoke licenses, and prevent acquisition [ s] of additional sta­
tions."198 Unlike the book commission in Bantam, Judge Tatel 
noted, the FCC controls the broadcaster's livelihood and its very 
existence.199 He observed that losing a license can have cata­
strophic effects on a broadcaster, and a threat to revoke its license 
can affect the broadcaster's capital raising abilities.2°O 
Judge Tatel cited Bantam, writing that "[p]eople do not lightly 
disregard public officers' thinly veiled threats to institute criminal 
proceedings against them if they do not come around."201 Here, 
Judge Tatel noted, the FCC is engaging in economic and regulatory 
coercion not because these broadcasts are indecent, but "because 
[the broadcaster] cannot get judicial review of the Commission's in­
decency determinations. "202 
Further, the dissent noted that because it is the censor's busi­
ness to censor, the Supreme Court has consistently warned that ad­
ministrative agencies tend to be less responsive than a court (which 
is an independent branch of government) to the constitutionally 
protected interests in free expression.203 "When administrators 
have 'unbridled discretion' to suppress speech, prompt review is all 
the more critical to minimize 'the danger of censorship and of 
abridgement of our precious First Amendment freedoms.' "204 
In addition, Judge Tatel observed that the Commission used 
and relied on unreviewed indecency determinations in order to im­
pose increased penalties on broadcasters that air materials which 
the Commission had previously declared indecent.205 The Commis­
sion's justification for such actions was that the past violations" 'es­
tablish a pattern of apparent misconduct warranting the fine we set 
U.S. at 67. These procedures provided for no judicial guidance or determinations at any 
stage. See id. at 71. 
197. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1264-65 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
198. Id. at 1264 (Tatel, J., dissenting). See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of FCC tactics. 
199. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1265 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
200. See id. at 1265-66 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
201. Id. at 1266 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
372 U.S. 58, 68 (1963». 
202. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
203. See id. at 1265 (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Freedman v. Maryland, 380 
U.S. 51, 57-58 (1965». 
204. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 
420 U.S. 546, 553, 560 (1975». 
205. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
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today.' "206 
Although the Commission told the broadcasters to learn what 
is "indecent" from the" 'actions that are out there,' "207 Judge Tatel 
noted that the Commission evaluated indecent material on a case 
by case basis.208 Further, he observed that the Commission had 
also rejected the broadcasters' claims that the material it aired was 
not indecent because it was similar to material the FCC had previ­
ously decided not to sanction.209 
Lastly, the dissent criticized the majority's alternative reme­
dies, most notably its suggestion that the broadcaster could initiate 
a declaratory judgment action against the FCC in the district 
court.210 This remedy, he emphasized, would shift the burden of 
proof onto the broadcaster. Quoting Freedman v. Maryland, Judge 
Tatel stated that "the government must bear 'the burden of institut­
ing judicial proceedings, and of prOVIng that the material is 
unprotected."211 ' 
IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS 
In order to determine whether the procedural safeguards of 
First Amendment Procedural Review212 are satisfied within the 
FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme, the issue of whether or not 
the forfeiture scheme results in a prior restraint on speech must first 
be addressed. The majority opinion in Action for Children's Televi­
sion concluded that although the FCC's forfeiture scheme con­
tained many troubling aspects, most notably the lengthy delays 
before judicial review could be obtained,213 the forfeiture scheme 
was not technically a prior restraint. It was instead, the majority 
206. Id. (TateI, J., dissenting) (quoting Letter to Rusk Corp., 8 F.c.c.R. 3228, 
3229 n.3 (1993)). 
207. Id. (Tatel, J., dissenting) (quoting Doug Halonen, Marshall Defines Stance 
on Indecency, ELEC. MEDIA, Jan. 15, 1990, at 136); see also LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 18, 
at 3 (arguing that a critical factor in determining indecent or obscene broadcasts is the 
"emergence of documented audience complaints." This, the author notes, makes it pos­
sible for a single listener, "armed with time and taping equipment," to cause broadcast­
ers, such as Howard Stem who consistently "push the envelope," a lot of problems). 
208. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1265 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
209. See id. (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
210. See id. at 1266 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
211. Id. at 1266-67 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
212. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text for this standard of proce­
dural due process review. See also supra Part II for a description of this standard and 
the cases from which it is derived. 
213. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
delays. 
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determined, a subsequent punishment,214 and therefore constitu­
tionally permissible. 
This analysis will discuss the Action for Children's Television 
majority opinion's analysis of the forfeiture scheme with respect to 
its prior restraint effects, and will asserf that the majority opinion 
was correct in its conclusion that the forfeiture scheme results in a 
subsequent punishment and not a prior restraint. However, this 
analysis will further assert that even though these forfeitures techni­
cally constituted subsequent punishments for past indecency viola­
tions, the dangers produced by the after-effects of these forfeiture 
orders constitute the functional equivalent of a prior restraint on 
protected speech, herein referred to as a "subsequent restraint." 
After concluding that the FCC's forfeiture scheme, as applied, 
effects a subsequent restraint on a broadcaster's speech, this analy­
sis asserts that the next step in First Amendment analysis should be 
taken-once a subsequent restraint has been found, a limited ver­
sion of First Amendment Procedural Review should be applied.215 
In this context, such a review can be styled a "Subsequent Restraint 
Review." Because the restraint on expression herein is not techni­
cally a prior restraint, but rather a subsequent restraint, this lesser 
version of First Amendment Procedural Review should be applied, 
similar to that which the Supreme Court utilized in Bantam.216 
Specifically, the forfeiture scheme should be scrutinized under only 
one First Amendment Procedural Review factor-the enforcement 
scheme must contain adequate procedural safeguards, such as 
prompt judicial review, to ensure against the chilling of protected 
214. See infra Part IV.A.l for a discussion of subsequent punishments. 
215. The factors that comprise First Amendment Procedural Review are: (1) the 
governmental agency's procedural enforcement scheme must contain the most rigorous 
procedural safeguards available to ensure against abridgement of First Amendment 
rights; (2) these procedural safeguards must include prompt judicial review of the chal­
lenged material; and (3) the burden of proving that the expression is unprotected by the 
Constitution, along with the burden of instituting proceedings, must be on the censor. 
See supra notes 133-36 for a discussion of First Amendment Procedural Review. 
216. See supra Part II.A for a discussion and analysis of the Supreme Court's 
plurality decision in Bantam. Although the Bantam Court characterized the Commis­
sion's actions as prior restraints, the device utilized by the Commission was technically a 
subsequent punishment, with after-effects sufficiently dangerous to constitute the func­
tional equivalent of a prior restraint. Therefore, this analysis argues that the one ele­
ment of First Amendment Procedural Review mandated by the Supreme Court in 
Bantam, which sufficed to determine the constitutionality of a prior restraint in that 
case, should be used in Action for Children's Television as well; namely, rigorous proce­
dural safeguards must be present to ensure against the suppression of protected speech, 
such as prompt judicial review. See infra Part IV.A.3 for a discussion of the Bantam 
Court's characterization of the Commission's actions. 
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speech. Additionally, this analysis argues that the court's sugges­
tion that Infinity could pursue two alternative remedies in order to 
circumvent the harm of the delay in judicial review-stipulate the 
facts and refuse to pay the forfeiture or bring a declaratory judg­
ment217-are not viable alternatives for a broadcaster to pursue. 
A. Prior Restraint or Subsequent Punishment? 
1. 	 The FCC's Forfeiture Orders are Indeed "Subsequent 
Punishments" and Not "Prior Restraints" On 
Speech 
In order to apply First Amendment Procedural Review218 to 
the FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme, an initial determination 
that the scheme effects a prior restraint on speech must be made. 
The forfeiture must not simply be a subsequent punishment for past 
conduct, but a prior restraint in that it bars speech in the future.219 
The line between subsequent punishments and prior restraints can 
be difficult to determine and is often blurred.220 The Supreme 
Court, however, had an opportunity to more clearly articulate its 
theory of the distinction between these two devices in Alexander v. 
United States .221 
a. 	 The Alexander decision222 
The facts of Alexander centered around a defendant who 
owned numerous businesses which dealt with sexually explicit 
217. See supra notes 184-87 and accompanying text for a discussion of the two 
alternative remedies the court discusses. 
218. See supra notes 133-36 for a discussion of this standard of review. 
219. See infra notes 230-35 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinc­
tion between prior restraints and subsequent punishments. 
220. See Scordato, supra note 91, at 8. 

The distinction [between prior restraints and subsequent punishments], as de­

veloped thus far, fails to provide a means of identifying a category of poten­

tially speech-suppressive government activities that is in any way meaningful 

for First Amendment purposes . . .. [N]early all laws, by their nature and 

purpose, are designed to influence human behavior prior to its actual occur­

rence . . . . After-the-[fjact sanctions are employed in the law largely to re­





Id. at 8-9 (citations omitted). 
221. 509 U.S. 544 (1993). Although Alexander was not cited by any of the opin­
ions in Action for Children's Television, it is included here because it is illustrative of 
the distinction the Supreme Court makes between subsequent punishments and prior 
restraints. 
222. See id. 
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materials.223 He was convicted of seventeen obscenity counts and 
three counts of violating the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or­
ganizations Act ("RICO").224 In addition to imposing a prison 
term and fine, the district· court ordered the defendant to forfeit 
certain assets directly related to his racketeering activity.225 The 
defendant appealed the forfeiture order, arguing that this forfeiture 
violated the First Amendment.226 The court of appeals affirmed the 
district court ruling, finding that the forfeiture order was a criminal 
penalty imposed following a conviction for conducting an enterprise 
engaged in racketeering activities and not a prior restraint on 
speech.227 
The defendant appealed to the United States Supreme Court, 
contending that the forfeiture in this case constituted an unconstitu­
tional prior restraint on speech and not a permissible criminal pun­
ishment.228 The defendant claimed that the "forfeiture of 
expressive materials and assets of business[ es] engaged in expres­
sive activity ... operate[s] as a prior restraint because it prohibits 
[future sales of the confiscated materials]."229 
The Supreme Court disagreed. The Court reasoned that "[t]he 
term prior restraint is used 'to describe administrative and judicial 
orders forbidding certain communications when issued in advance 
of the time that such communications are to oCCUr."'230 In this 
case, the Court pointed out that defendant's forfeiture did not for­
bid him from engaging in any expressive activities in the future, and 
it did not require him to obtain prior approval for expressive activi­
ties.231 The forfeiture order imposed no legal impediment to de­
fendant's ability to engage in any expressive activity, because he 
could buy new inventory and resume selling the sexually explicit 
223. See id. at 546. 
224. See id. The obscenity convictions were based upon the jury's findings that 
four magazines and three videotapes sold at several of defendant's stores were obscene, 
and served as the predicates for his three RICO convictions. See id. 
225. The Court ordered the defendant to forfeit his wholesale and retail business, 
as well as almost $9,000,000 in cash, which he had acquired through racketeering activ­
ity. See id. at 548. 
226. See id. 
227. See Alexander v. Thornburgh, 943 F.2d 825, 834 (8th Cir. 1991). 
228. See Alexander, 509 u.s. at 549. 
229. Id. 
230. Id. at 550 (citations omitted). Classic examples of prior restraints are refus­
als to issue permits necessary to permit speech or expressive activities, or a pre-publica­
tion review where a decision is made to refuse permission to print an article. See id. 
231. See id. at 550-51. 
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materials.232 
The forfeiture here was a punishment for past criminal con­
duct,233 not a prior restraint on speech.234 The Court concluded 
that the defendant's proposed definition of the term prior restraint 
would "undermine the time-honored distinction between barring 
speech in the future and penalizing past speech."235 The defendant 
cannot, the Court stated, prevail by simply arguing that the forfei­
ture "chills" free expression by deterring others from engaging in 
protected speech, because the threat of a forfeiture has no more 
chilling effect on free expression than the threat of a prison term or 
a large fine.236 
b. Alexander applied to the FCC forfeiture enforcement scheme 
The court of appeals in Action for Children's Television noted 
that Infinity, although excessively fined by the FCC for what it con­
sidered to be "indecent" broadcasts, was essentially free to air what 
it wished.237 Only if the FCC considered what it aired to be a viola­
tion of its indecency standards did a penalty result.238 According to 
the Court in Alexander, this violation is a subsequent punishmt<nt 
because it occurs after the fact, not prior thereto.239 
As in Alexander, Infinity was being penalized for past expres­
sive actions, not for future speech. A subsequent punishment for 
the broadcast of speech is constitutionally permissible, whereas a 
prior restraint on the broadcast of speech is a violation of the First 
Amendment240 if it does not contain the procedural safeguards in­
herent in First Amendment Procedural Review.241 Therefore, the 
majority in Action for Children's Television reasoned, since no prior 
restraint on First Amendment freedoms was being utilized, Infin­
ity's claim for relief was denied.242 
The D.C. Circuit was correct in its determination that the 
232. See id. at 551. 
233. The defendant had a full criminal trial on the merits of the RICO charge, 
wherein the government established beyond a reasonable doubt the basis for the forfei­
ture. See id. at 552. 
234. See id. at 553. 
235. Id. 
236. See id. at 556. 
237. Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1995). 
238. See id. 
239. See id. 
240. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 553 (1993). 
241. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text for details of this standard. 
242. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1260. 
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FCC's forfeiture scheme does not technically constitute a prior re­
straint on speech. The forfeitures were not levied in advance of the 
broadcasts, thus forbidding the communications from occurring. 
Rather, the forfeitures punished the broadcaster for past, allegedly 
indecent broadcasts, and did not technically forbid the broadcaster 
from engaging in any expressive activities in the future.243 The for­
feitures imposed as punishment for past conduct in Action for Chil­
dren's Television are comparable to the forfeitures imposed in 
Alexander for past criminal conduct. In neither case were the for­
feitures an express bar to any future expressive activity. 




Although the D.C. Circuit was correct in its finding that the 
forfeitures imposed upon Infinity by the FCC were subsequent pun­
ishments and not prior restraints, the court erred in limiting its fo­
cus to the actual punishment imposed at the time the forfeiture was 
issued, rather than fo'cusing on the after-effects that the punishment 
imposes upon the broadcaster. For example, while the forfeiture 
penalty itself may indeed be constitutionally permissible, the length 
of the delay244 which the broadcaster must endure in order to ob­
243. See supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text for a discussion of the forfei­
ture fines levied on Infinity Broadcasting, Inc. in Action for Children's Television. 
244. According to the Bantam and Freedman Courts, the period of time between 
the issuance of the complaint and judicial review should be prompt. See Freedman v. 
Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58-59 (1965); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 
(1963). Exactly' what constitutes a reasonably "prompt" period of time has been dis­
cussed not only by the United States Supreme Court, but by several courts of appeals as 
well. Collectively, these cases establish that a wait as lengthy as five years for judicial 
review is not reasonable. hi Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 562 
(1975), the Supreme Court indicated that a five month wait for effective judicial review 
on the merits was not reasonable, and could not constitute "prompt" judicial review. In 
U.S. v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 372-74 (1971), the Supreme Court held 
that a three month delay for judicial review was unacceptable, as it was not reasonably 
"prompt. " 
Recent courts of appeals cases seem to have agreed with the Supreme Court's de­
termination of permissible length of delay. In East Brooks Books, Inc. v. City ofMem­
phis, 48 F.3d 220, 225 (6th Cir. 1995), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth 
Circuit stated "[a]lthough the Supreme Court has not expressly defined prompt judicial 
review, we believe that potential delays of over five months are impermissible." In 
11,126 Baltimore Boulevard, Inc. v. Prince George's County, 32 F.3d 109 (4th Cir. 1994), 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that an eight month wait 
for judicial review was not a reasonably prompt period of time for an adult bookstore to 
wait after challenging the constitutionality of regulations restraining its operations. The 
court stated "[w]e do not believe that the length of this delay can be considered the type 
of brief specified period followed by prompt judicial review required to guard against 
the abridgement of protected speech." Id. at 117. 
276 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:241 
tain judicial review amounts to a prior restraint on speech.245 Be­
cause the FCC will increase the fine imposed for any subsequent 
indecency violation, the broadcaster is estopped from airing the 
challenged material until it receives judicial review or risk increased 
forfeitures.246 
In order to receive judicial review under the enforcement 
scheme as it stands today, however, the broadcaster will likely wait 
as long as five years from the time a program was aired to its first 
opportunity for judicial review.247 As a result, the broadcaster re­
mains unsure of the status of the challenged material for up to 
seven years, which could certainly result in the "chilling" of pro­
tected speech. This creates a risk that nonindecent speech will be 
suppressed for indefinite periods of time prior to any judicial 
determination.248 
245. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text for description of the delays 
inherent in the FCC's enforcement scheme. The FCC forfeiture enforcement scheme, 
once implemented against a broadcaster, proves so onerous and delay-ridden that 
broadcasters invariably pay the forfeiture fine rather than submit to such a lengthy, 
grueling and costly procedure in order to receive a judicial determination of the mate­
rial. It is inevitable that broadcasters, when faced with such a scheme, choose to err on 
the side of caution and broadcast only that material which it is certain will not be 
deemed indecent. 
246. See supra Part I.A-C for a discussion of the FCC's forfeiture enforcement 
scheme. 
247. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1254. See also supra notes 
50-51 for a discussion of the delays inherent in the FCC forfeiture enforcement scheme. 
Although, as the majority in Action for Children's Television pointed out, the broad­
caster could institute a declaratory judgment action in federal district court and thereby 
receive a full adjudication on the merits, the broadcaster must wait to do so until the 
FCC issues the actual NAL. See supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text for a discus­
sion of the process by which an NAL is issued. The NAL is the Commission's determi­
nation that in fact an indecent broadcast has occurred, and can take as long as twenty­
three months from the date of the broadcast to issue. See supra note 50. Therefore, if 
the broadcaster chooses to initiate court proceedings by filing a declaratory judgment, it 
must nevertheless wait up to twenty-three months before doing so, and during that time 
cannot re-broadcast the disputed material without incurring additional fines. See supra 
notes 39-40 for a discussion of the additional fines which can be placed upon broadcast­
ers for subsequent airings of disputed materials while awaiting judicial adjudication. 
Furthermore, the filing of a declaratory judgment by the broadcaster will unduly shift 
the burden of proof onto the broadcaster-a circumstance proscribed by First Amend­
ment Procedural Review, which insists that the burden of proof be on the censor. See 
infra Part IV.C for a discussion of the declaratory judgment remedy for a broadcaster. 
Because of the likelihood of such a shift in the burden of proof, a broadcaster may be 
understandably hesitant to pursue the declaratory judgment remedy, in which case it 
could be forced to wait up to seven years for judicial review. 
248. See Chesapeake B & M, Inc. v. Harford County, 58 F.3d 1005, 1012 (4th Cir. 
1995) (holding that an ordinance that lacked specific time limits for judicial decision on 
the merits did not provide for prompt judicial review and was therefore unconstitu­
tional under Freedman); Redner v. Dean, 29 F.3d 1495, 1503 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding 
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The FCC's enforcement scheme, however, has other, even 
greater adverse effects on broadcasters which result, collectively, in 
the functional equivalent of a prior restraint on speech. The FCC, 
for example, uses threats, intimidation, and coercion in its attempts 
to collect forfeiture fines by threatening to revoke a broadcaster's 
license.249 A broadcaster cannot operate its business without a li­
cense to do so, nor can it continue to broadcast even fully protected 
speech. The impact that the threat of revocation would have upon 
a broadcaster's ability to not only operate its business, but raise 
capital as well, would be catastrophic.250 
Furthermore, the FCC can thwart a broadcaster's attempted 
economic development by acts such as blocking proposed acquisi­
tions of additional stations.251 Faced with such threats, the broad­
caster inevitably acquiesces and pays the fine in order to free itself 
from the possibility of such penaities.252 The Action for Children's 
Television court refused to find that these FCC "tactics" exempli­
fied a system resulting in technical prior restraints on expression. 
Instead, the court of appeals held that these tactics constituted a 
constitutionally permissible subsequent punishment. 
By contrast, the Supreme Court in Bantam acknowledged the 
existence of tactics used by the book commission that were similar 
to those used against Infinity by the FCC, and labeled them prior 
that an ordinance regulating nude dancing in adult entertainment establishments was 
violative of the FIrst Amendment in that it imposed prior restraints without providing 
for prompt judicial review); see also Riley v. National Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 
802 (1988) (holding that a licensing scheme that failed to provide for definite limitations 
on the time within which the licensor must issue the license was constitutionally 
repugnant). 
249. See supra notes 197-202 and accompanying text for a description of the 
FCC's tactics and the effects they have on broadcasters. See also Goldsamt, supra note 
45, at 205 (arguing that tactics by the FCC-the excessive fining of broadcasters and 
threats to revoke broadcasters' licenses-suggest the need for a new defense to be used 
by the broadcaster, sintilar to selective prosecution defenses recognized by courts in the 
criminal context). 
250. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1265-66. 
251. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text for discussion of the FCC's 
attempt at blocking Infinity's acquisition of another station. 
252. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1255. The FCC suggests that 
broadcasters look to previously published NALs and forfeiture orders for guidance to 
determine its standard of indecency. See id. at 1254-55. However, none of these NAL 
determinations or forfeiture orders have been reviewed by a court of law. The court in 
Action for Children's Television indicated that the plaintiffs had failed to make a show­
ing that the delay in providing judicial review "chills" protected as well as indecent 
speech. See id. at 1261-62. However, because no forfeiture has ever been the subject of 
a judicial determination, it is impossible for the broadcasters to affirmatively show that 
protected speech is being chilled. See id. at 1254. 
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restraints on expression.253 The Bantam Court found that the book 
commission's use of threats, invoking legal sanctions, and other 
means of coercion, intimidation and persuasion constituted a sys­
tem of prior restraints.254 Although the publishers were free to ig­
nore the book commission's notices, the Court stated that their 
threats constituted informal censorship.255 
The court of appeals in Action for Children's Television, how­
ever, declined to follow the Supreme Court's reasoning in Bantam, 
instead arguing that the FCC's actions did not constitute a technical 
prior restraint on speech.256 The Supreme Court's holding in Ban­
tam appears to be contrary to the doctrine of prior restraint be­
cause the penalties imposed upon the publishers did not prohibit 
them from distributing expressive materials, but instead threatened 
punishment after the distribution of such materials. Although the 
Bantam holding would seem to be technically inaccurate, especially 
in the wake of the Alexander decision, the holding appears to evi­
dence a desire by the Supreme Court to acknowledge and protect 
against the dangers of a subsequent punishment when its effects re­
sult in a functional prior restraint scheme.257 While a technical 
prior restraint did not exist in Bantam, the Court acknowledged the 
need to protect against the dangers that were created as a result of 
the subsequent punishment imposed upon the distributors. .The 
Bantam holding illustrates the fact that "functional" prior re­
straints, herein termed subsequent restraints, can be created as a 
result of subsequent punishments. 
Although an individual forfeiture order imposed upon a broad­
caster may be. a subsequent punishment and not a technical prior 
restraint, the FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme in its entirety 
results in a subsequent restraint on speech, as did the book commis­
sion's activities in Bantam.258 The delay in judicial review, and its 
subsequent effects on a broadcaster's behavior during the period of 
253. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 68 (1962). 
254. See id. at 67. See also supra Part II.A for a discussion of the Bantam Court's 
holding. 
255. See Bantam, 372 U.S. at 68. 
256. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1261. 
257. See supra Part II.A for a discussion of the Bantam Court's holding. 
258. See Scordato, supra note 91, at 33 (arguing that "[i]n those cases in which 
government conduct violates the First Amendment even if not found to be a prior re­
straint on speech, the Court's reliance on the prior restraint doctrine to invalidate the 
conduct leaves open the possibility that the same speech suppressive activity might be 
found unconstitutional if sufficiently redesigned and recast in the form of a subsequent 
[punishment]."). 
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time between the imposition of the first forfeiture and the eventual 
judicial review impermissibly restrains speech that may be pro­
tected by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court in Bantam 
recognized that when such a situation is present, protection needs 
to be offered the person being censored, and a standard of review 
to determine the constitutionality of the restraint needs to be 
applied.259 
3. 	 Alternative Standard for Determining When a Prior 
Restraint Exists 
The majority in the Action for Children's Television case was 
. correct in its determination that the FCC's forfeiture enforcement 
scheme was not technically a prior restraint based upon Supreme 
Court precedents.260 However, the' dangers inherent in such a 
scheme, detailed above, are quite serious in nature and yet there is 
no 	protection whatsoever offered against them. 
According to the current standards for prior restraint re­
view,261 it is an "all or nothing" situation-if the FCC subjects a 
broadcaster to a prior restraint, it will receive full First Amendment 
protection. If, however, there is no "technical" prior restraint af­
fecting the broadcaster's programming, yet the actions being taken 
against the broadcaster result in the chilling of possibly protected 
speech, the broadcaster is afforded no constitutional protection. 
When the dangers that exist in a typical prior restraint case262 
exist in a case where a prior restraint does not "technically" exist, 
there should be in place a standard of protection that will ensure 
that the danger of infringement upon First Amendment rights is not 
allowed to flourish. A new approach is called for in such situations, 
an approach that recognizes that in the broadcast medium prior re­
straints may be effected in ways that would typically be labeled sub­
sequent punishments,263 yet their results (the chilling of possibly 
protected speech) are the same as the imposition of a prior re­
straint. In these cases, instead of offering no protection against the 
259. See Bantam, 372 U.S. at 66. 
260. See Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 
438 U.S. 726 (1978); Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). Because the Bantam 
Court found a prior restraint where one technically did not exist, the Action for Chil­
dren's Television decision could not have been based upon this Supreme Court 
precedent. 
261. See supra note 91 for a discussion of the prior restraint doctrine. 
262. See Part IV.A.2 for a description of these dangers. 
263. See supra notes 229-34 and accompanying text for a description of the term 
"subsequent punishment." 
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infringement of First Amendment rights, courts should apply an 
analysis similar to the one it uses for prior restraint review: a Subse­
quent Restraint Review. 
Under this new standard of review, the court should begin with 
the determination that, although the broadcaster is technically 
faced with the imposition of a subsequent punishment for a previ­
ously aired program, the effects of the subsequent punishment re­
sult in a subsequent restraint on the broadcaster's freedom of 
speech.264 Once the court makes this initial determination, it 
should then examine the forfeiture scheme under a modified ver­
sion of First Amendment Procedural Review,265 such as that uti­
lized by the Supreme Court in Bantam.266 Under this modified 
standard of review, the court must determine whether there are rig­
orous procedural safeguards in place, such as prompt267 judicial re­
view, to ensure against the infringement of First Amendment 
protections.268 If this factor is satisfied, the subsequent restraint is 
constitutionally permissible. If, however, this factor is not satisfied, 
264. See supra Part IV.A.2 for a discussion of how such a determination is made. 
265. See supra notes 133-36 and accompanying text for a description of the First 
Amendment Procedural Review standard. 
266. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1962). In Bantam the 
Supreme Court stated that in order for the book commission's enforcement scheme to 
be constitutionally permissible, it must contain the most rigorous procedural safeguards, 
such as judicial review, to ensure against the chilling of protected expression. See id. 
Therefore, in Bantam, when dealing with a functional prior restraint, the Supreme 
Court required merely the satisfaction of one of the First Amendment Procedural Re­
view factors-prompt judicial review. The Freedman Court later expanded this test, 
adding the additional two factors to First Amendment Procedural Review, to be utilized 
when dealing with a technical prior restraint. 
Because Action for Children's Television deals with a functional prior restraint, as 
did Bantam, solely the factor of "prompt judicial review," derived from the Bantam 
holding, comprises the modified version of First Amendment Procedural Review, to be 
utilized when dealing with subsequent restraints. 
267. Some constitutional theorists advocate permitting no restraint whatsoever 
before judicial review is provided, arguing that the proper construction of the prior 
restraint doctrine focuses exclusively on the issue of providing a full and fair judicial 
hearing prior to any abridgement of First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Martin H. Red­
ish, The Proper Role of Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. 
REv. 53, 79 (1984) (arguing that emphasizing the need for prompt judicial review "to­
tally disregards the harm resulting from the interim invasion of the free speech right 
caused by an administrative restraint prior to even the promptest judicial review[;] ... 
[no] form of administrative prior restraint [] should ever be deemed constitutionally 
valid"). 
268. S~e Bantam, 372 U.S. at 71. The Supreme Court's test for the constitutional­
ity of a functional prior restraint was solely this factor of First Amendment Procedural 
Review. The Court in Freedman then expanded this test for application when dealing 
with a technical prior restraint. See supra note 266 for a discussion of this "expansion." 
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such as in Action for Children's Television,269 the subsequent re­
straint fails Subsequent Restraint Review, and is an unconstitu­
tional restraint on First Amendment freedom of speech.270 
a. Subsequent Restraint Review standard examined 
The choice of prompt judicial review as the crucial requirement 
for subsequent restraint review is rooted in the important distinc­
tions between administrative agencies and courts of law. In Freed­
man, the Court noted, "[b]ecause the censor's business is to censor, 
there is the danger that he may well be less responsive than a court 
... to the constitutionally protected interests in free expression."271 
The Freedman Court indicated that it was preferable to have FIrst 
Amendment claims determined by a court of law, rather than a gov­
ernmental agency,2n because "only a judicial determination ... en­
sures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a 
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a 
valid final restraint."273 
The reasons behind the Bantam and Freedman Court's prefer­
ence for judicial determinations rest on two basic premises. First, 
federal and many state judges are free from political pressures be­
cause of their long judicial tenures.274 FCC Commissioners, by con­
trast, are politically motivated and driven.275 Therefore, an agency 
269. The FCC enforcement scheme contained no procedural safeguards to ensure 
against the suppression of constitutionally protected speech, and did not provide for 
prompt judicial review. See supra Part I.A-C for a discussion of the FCC's forfeiture 
enforcement scheme. 
270. Not all prior restraints on speech are unconstitutional. Only when a prior 
restraint lacks adequate procedural safeguards to ensure against the suppression of pro­
tected speech is the restraint unconstitutional. See Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 
60 (1965). 
271. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 57·58. 
272. Due to the fact that the broadcast medium is afforded lesser FIrst Amend­
ment protection than other mediums of expression, the FCC is allowed greater discre· 
tion in passing upon the indecency of speech. See supra notes 81·84 and accompanying 
text for a discussion of the FIrst Amendment protection afforded the broadcast me· 
dium. Therefore, agency administrators, instead of courts of law, initially pass upon the 
broadcaster's FIrst Amendment claims. While most administrative agencies provide a 
claimant with an internal agency adjudicative process before an administrative law 
judge, the forfeiture enforcement scheme does not provide the broadcaster with such an 
opportunity. See STRAUSS, supra note 45, at 45. The determination of the "indecent" 
content of the broadcast by the FCC is made solely by the Commission members. See 
supra notes 38-41 and accompanying text for a discussion of the procedures utilized by 
the Commission members in making indecency determinations. 
273. Freedman, 380 U.S. at 58. 
274. See Monaghan, supra note 85, at 522. 
275. See Tananbaum, supra note 127, at 1825; Redish, supra note 267, at 76·77. 
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censor will adjust the definition of "indecent" broadcasts not only 
along with the current societal definition of such terms, but along 
with the politics of the current administration. By contrast, judges 
take an impartial view, and consider the long term effects their de­
cisions will have on society.276 
Second, an agency administrator, whose duty it is to root out 
and dispose of "indecent" or "obscene" material, becomes an "ex­
pert" authorized to restrain and prohibit speech, with a tendency to 
lean invariably toward restraint.277 "They cannot be relied on to be 
sensitive to first amendment concerns because their very reason for 
existence is rooting out violations of the statutory schemes they are 
mandated to enforce."278 Therefore, judges are more sympathetic 
. and more impartial than administrative agencies, and thus are more 
well-suited to protect the constitutional interests of free 
expression.279 
b. 	 Application of Subsequent Restraint Review to the FCC 

forfeiture enforcement scheme 

Under the analysis presented in the prior section, the FCC's 
forfeiture enforcement scheme can only be constitutional if it pro­
vides for prompt judicial review, and thus satisfies Subsequent Re­
straint Review.· Although the FCC's forfeiture enforcement 
scheme does not specifically provide for judicial review in any par­
ticular provision of its regulatory scheme,280 the Action for Chil
276. See Monaghan, supra note 85, at 523; see also, Tananbaum, supra note 127, 
at 1825 ("[C)ourts take a broader, more sympathetic view [than administrators] .... 
This makes judges, at least presumptively, more impartial."). 
277. See Monaghan, supra note 85, at 523; see also Thomas Emerson, The Doc­
trine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 659 (1955) ("The function of 
the censor is to censor. He has a professional interest in finding things to suppress."); 
John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE L.J. 409, 422 (1983) ("Per­
sons who choose to fill [the role of administrator] may well have psychological tenden­
cies to overstate the need for suppression . . . . [T]here are powerful institutional 
pressures to justify one's job, and ultimately one's own importance by exaggerating the 
evils which suppression seeks to avoid."); Scordato, supra note 91, at 22-23 (arguing 
that judges should be the preferred decision makers because they will be relatively 
more risk-averse in their decision making). 
278. Tananbaum, supra note 127, at 1825 (discussing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 
U.S. 51, 58 (1965». 
279. See id. For an in depth treatment of the FCC and both its broad indecency 
standard and broad powers, see Paul J. Feldman, The FCC and Regulation ofBroadcast 
Indecency: Is There a National Broadcast Standard in the Audience?, 41 FED. COMM. 
L.J. 369 (1989). 
280. In fact, the first opportunity for judicial review under the FCC forfeiture 
enforcement scheme is when the United States Attorney files suit against the broad­
caster to enforce a forfeiture order which the broadcaster refuses to pay. The delay 
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dren's Television majority argued that this review is available 
through two alternative remedies that a broadcaster may pursue in 
order to expedite judicial review.281 First, the broadcaster could 
stipulate the facts giving rise to the NAL, and refuse to pay the 
forfeiture unless the district court orders it to do so. The Commis­
sion could then immediately forward the case to the Department of 
Justice so that the broadcaster would quickly receive a trial on the 
merits of the forfeiture.282 
While this remedy may satisfy one of the First Amendment 
Procedural Review factors-that the burden of proof remain on the 
censor, it fails the one other crucial factor which must be satisfied 
when utilizing Subsequent Restraint Review-the judicial review 
must be prompt. This remedy depends upon the FCC's ability to 
"immediately" forward the case to the United States Attorney, and 
the Department of Justice's willingness to then act quickly. The 
FCC has shown its inability to expedite such matters, and it would 
be unwise to believe that it would move more quickly in such an 
instance than it normally does. As Judge Tatel observed, "I do not 
think this offers broadcasters much relief since it completely de­
pends on the willingness of two different agencies to expedite their 
actions. "283 
Second, the court suggested that if the FCC does not cooperate 
in a broadcaster's attempt at the first remedy, a broadcaster" 'suf­
fering from demonstrably adverse consequences from government 
delay in initiating the collection proceeding ... could bring a declar­
atory judgment action against the United States in the district 
court."'284 This approach, the majority reasoned, should promptly 
dispel any unwarranted "chilling" effects on speech.285 
There are two distinct problems with the majority's reliance on 
this remedy. First, although the broadcaster will receive a full adju­
dication on the merits once the declaratory judgment action is 
between the initial notification by the FCC to the broadcaster of its determination that 
a broadcast was indecent, and the actual filing by the United States Attorney to enforce 
the order could be as long as five years .. See supra notes 50-52 for a discussion of the 
length of delay inherent in the FCC's forfeiture enforcement scheme. 
281. See Action for Children's Television v. FCC, 59 F.3d 1249, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 
1995). See supra notes 184-85 and accompanying text for a discussion of these 
remedies. 
282. See Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1262; supra note 184 and 
accompanying text. 
283. Action for Children's Television, 59 F.3d at 1266 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
284. Id. at 1262 (quoting Pleasant Broad. Co. v. FCC, 564 F.2d 496, 502 (1977». 
285. See id. 
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heard, the broadcaster must wait up to twenty-three months286 in 
order to file such an action.287 Because the FCC is under no techni­
cal time constraints within which it must issue a NAL to a broad­
caster, the broadcaster must wait an undetermined length of time in 
order to discover if a NAL will be issued against it. During that 
period of time, the broadcaster has been put on notice that it has 
aired a "questionable" broadcast,288 Although there has been no 
formal notice issued to the broadcaster that the broadcast indeed 
contained indecent material, the broadcaster must refrain from any 
subsequent broadcasts of the disputed material or be subject to ad­
ditional forfeiture fines.289 The delay the broadcaster must face in 
obtaining judicial review of the subject material can potentially be 
significant (up to five years),290 and is certainly contrary to the Ban­
tam Court's recitation that the judicial review must necessarily be 
"prompt."291 
The second problem with the declaratory judgment remedy is 
that, thus far, it has not been tested as a viable remedy by broad­
casters who wish to challenge FCC indecency rulings. Therefore, 
because this device has not yet been utilized in the courts by broad­
casters in relation to the FCC forfeiture enforcement scheme, a 
broadcaster cannot be certain that a court would allow its declara­
tory judgment action to proceed. Typically, courts uphold adminis­
trative schemes and may likely prevent such an attempt by a 
broadcaster to circumvent the normal administrative process.292 
286. See supra note 244 for a discussion of case law defining the parameters of 
"prompt" judicial review. While neither the Supreme Court nor the circuit courts of 
appeals have expressly defined "prompt" judicial review, their decisions discussing what 
constitutes an unreasonable delay have disapproved of delays much shorter than those 
inherent in the FCC forfeiture scheme, typically ranging from three to eight months in 
length. 
287. See supra note 50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the length of 
time a broadcaster must wait before a NAL is issued from the FCC declaring the broad­
cast indecent under the FCC indecency standards. See also supra note 244 for a discus­
sion of the meaning of the term "prompt." 
288. The broadcaster is sent a LOI indicating that the broadcast is under investi­
gation for possible indecency violations. See supra Part I.A-B for a discussion of the 
LOI and NAL process. 
289. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text for a discussion of these addi­
tional fines. 
290. See Action for Childrens Television v. FCC, 827 F. Supp. 4, 8 (D.D.C. 1993). 
291. See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1962). See also supra 
note 244 for a discussion of what constitutes a reasonably "prompt" period of time to 
wait for judicial review. 
292. See infra note 296 for a discussion of the reasons why courts are reluctant to 
allow plaintiffs to circumvent administrative schemes. 
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Reasons for the courts' preference for exhaustion of administrative 
schemes are several. First, upholding the administrative scheme 
carries out the legislative intent in granting such authority to the 
agency.293 Second, it protects the agency's autonomy.294 Third, it 
aids judicial review, in that it allows the parties to develop the facts 
during the agency proceeding.295 Lastly, it promotes judicial econ­
omy.296 A court could easily prevent this circumvention a number 
of ways. For example, a court could insist the broadcaster's claim 
lacks ripeness297 due to a failure to exhaust administrative reme­
dies. Furthermore, a court could cite other "technicalities," such as 
jurisdiction, to strike down a broadcaster's attempt at pursuing a 
declaratory judgment.298 Because both of these alternative reme­
dies proposed by the Action for Children's Television majority con­
tain substantial risk to the broadcaster, these remedies are not 
viable options for the broadcaster to pursue. 
Therefore, the Action for Children's Television majority erred 
in its conclusion that the filing of a declaratory judgment action by a 
broadcaster would prevent the imposition of prior restraints on the 
broadcast medium. Scrutinizing the FCC forfeiture enforcement 
scheme under the sole requirement of Subsequent Restraint Re­
293. See Andrade v. Lauer, 729 F.2d 1475, 1484 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
294. See id. 
295. See id. 
296. See id. In Andrade, the United States District Court for the District of Co­
lumbia stated that: 
The exhaustion [of administrative remedies] requirement serves four primary 
purposes. First, it carries out the congressional purpose in granting authority 
to the agency by discouraging the "frequent and deliberate flouting of admin­
istrative processes [that] could ... encourag[e] people to ignore its proce­
dures." Second, it protects agency autonomy by allowing the agency the 
opportunity in the first instance to apply its expertise, exercise whatever dis­
cretion it may have been granted, and correct its errors. Third, it aids judicial 
review by allowing the parties and the agency to develop the facts of the case 
in the agency proceeding. Fourth, it promotes judicial economy by avoiding 
needless repetition of administrative and judicial factfinding, and by perhaps 
avoiding the necessity of any judicial involvement at all if the parties success­
fully vindicate their claims before the agency. 
Id. at 1484 (citation omitted); see also McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 145 (1992) 
(holding that exhaustion "serves the twin purposes of protecting administrative agency 
authority and promoting judicial efficiency"); McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 
193-95 (1969) (summarizing functions of exhaustion of administrative remedies doc­
trine); BERNARD SCHWARTZ, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 730 (3d ed. 1988). 
297. See Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 756-57 (1975) (holding that, as 
a general rule, one must exhaust administrative procedures available before an order is 
ripe for review by a federal court). 
298. See supra note 296 for a discussion of the reasons courts will not typically 
allow this circumvention around administrative schemes. 
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view, it is clear that unless this scheme can provide for prompt judi­
cial review, and the FCC takes clear steps to ensure that this review 
is received within a "reasonably prompt" period of time, the 
scheme itself is unconstitutional. 
CONCLUSION 
Although the majority in Action for Children's Television was 
correct, as a technical matter, in labeling the forfeiture penalties 
themselves as subsequent punishments and not prior restraints on 
speech, the majority erred in refusing to consider the after-effects 
that the forfeitures and the 'enforcement scheme in its entirety have 
upon the broadcaster. When the dangers produced by these after­
effects constitute a subsequent restraint on speech, a new, modified 
version of First Amendment Procedural Review should be applied: 
a Subsequent Restraint Review. 
When analyzing the constitutionality of a prior restraint on ex­
pression, the Supreme Court has created a three-part test, herein 
termed First Amendment Procedural Review. This test requires: 
(1) a' government agency's enforcement scheme must contain the 
most rigorous procedural safeguards available to ensure against 
abridgement of First Amendment protections; (2) these procedural 
safeguards must include prompt judicial review of the challenged 
material; and (3) the burden of proving that the expression is un­
protected by the Constitution, as well as the burden of instituting 
proceedings, must be on the censor. 
However, when analyzing the constitutionality of a subsequent 
restraint on expression, a modified version of First Amendment 
Procedural Review, herein termed Subsequent Restraint Review, 
should be utilized. ,This review is comprised solely of one First 
Amendment Procedural Review factor-there must be rigorous 
procedural safeguards in place to ensure against the infringement of 
First Amendment protections; namely, prompt judicial review. 
Because the FCC forfeiture enforcement scheme effects a sub­
sequent restraint on expression, rather than a technical prior re­
straint, the scheme should be scrutinized under the sole factor of 
Subsequent Restraint Review. Specifically, the enforcement 
scheme will be deemed constitutional if it provides for prompt judi­
cial review. 
The FCC forfeiture enforcement scheme does not provide for 
prompt judicial review. The delay the broadcaster must face in ob­
taining judicial review can be up to five years. During that period 
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of time, the broadcaster has been put on notice that it has aired a 
"questionable" broadcast. The broadcaster must refrain from any 
subsequent broadcasts of the disputed material, or be subject to ad­
ditional forfeiture fines. Therefore, the length of the delay, coupled 
with the chilling effect on possibly protected speech which the for­
feiture has upon the broadcaster, constitutes an unconstitutional 
subsequent restraint on speech. 
Christine C. Peaslee 
